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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND COMPENSATION IN POLAND
DR. KINGA BACZYK-ROZWADOWSKA*
INTRODUCTION
1. The Polish health care system has undergone many significant
changes recently. The Institutional Health Care Providers Act (Ustawa o
zakladach opieki zdrowotnej) of August 30, 19911 officially repealed the
former framework of State health care (paristwowa sluzba zdrowia) and
paved the.way for establishing private activities, including the provision of
health care, the pharmaceutical industry, medical supplies, ambulatory
diagnostic services, as well as a wide range of hospital services. 2 However,
until January 1, 1999 it was still a taxation-based system in which the ma-
jority of medical services were financed by Government sources through
budget allocation (made by the Ministry of Finance). 3
On January 1, 1999, the Universal Health Insurance Act (Ustawa o
powszechnym ubezpieczeniu zdrowotnym) of February 6, 19974 came into
force, introducing national health insurance (powszechne ubezpieczenie
zdrowotne) based on the principles of equal treatment, social solidarity,
equal access to health care services, and a free choice of medical care pro-
viders. These principles reflected Article 68 of the newly enacted Polish
Constitution of April 17, 1997, which vests everyone with the right to have
his health protected (Section 1) as well as the right to equal access to publi-
cally-funded medical services (Section 2).5
The fundamental idea of the national health insurance was to separate
the purchasing of health care services from the delivery of these services (a
* Doctor of Law (since 2006), Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law and Administration of
the Nicholas Copernicus University of Torufi, Poland, Department of Civil and International Commer-
cial Law (Chamber of Medical Law); specializes in tort law, law of obligations, medical law and con-
sumer law; author of a book (monograph) Civil Liability for Medical Malpractice and other
publications (articles, glosses) concerning in particular medical law and tort law.
1. Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1991, No. 91, item 408 (Pol.) - as amended.
2. M. Nesterowicz, E. Bagidska, Medical Legislation in Poland, Yearbook of European Medical
Law, Liding6 11 (2005).
3. For more information, see M. Nesterowicz, E. Bagifiska, A. den Exter Medical Law, the
Hague-London-New York 24 (2002).
4. Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1997, No. 28, item 153 (Pol.).
5. See Kinga Bqczyk-Rozwadowska, ODPOWIEDZIALNOk CYWILNA ZA SZKODY WYRZADZONE
PRZY LECZENIU 141-142 (2007).
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"purchaser-provider split"). A system in which health care was to be con-
tracted seemed to be the best way to encourage competition between medi-
cal services providers to bid for contracts with the institutions in charge of
financing public health care.6 Therefore, the Universal Health Insurance
Act established so-called health insurance funds (Kasy Chorych),7 respon-
sible for collecting premiums from the insured and purchasing medical
services by signing performance-based contracts with both public and pri-
vate health care facilities (hospitals, clinics, medical centers) as well as
individual health care professionals (doctors and other members of the
medical profession, e.g., nurses, midwives, laboratory assistants).8 These
contracts determined the type and scope of health care provided, the terms
and conditions of rendering services, maximum cost settlement, principles
of medical service quality, quality monitoring and control mechanisms, as
well as the principles of supervision, documentation, and complaint proce-
dures. In 2003, due to the need to centralize the insurance scheme, health
funds (Kasy Chorych) were replaced with one state entity called the Na-
tional Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia (NFZ). However, no other
structural changes were made to the overall arrangement of health care.
The actual national health insurance scheme operates pursuant to the
provisions of the Publicly-Funded Health Care Services Act (Ustawa o
dwiadczeniach zdrowotnych finansowanych ze ir6del blicznych) of August
28, 2004.9 The scheme is still obligatory for almost all citizens (those who
are not subject to the insurance mandate may acquire an insurance coverage
voluntarily).10 Eligibility for health care services is thus no longer automat-
ic (as it was in the former taxation system) but is based on the payment of
premiums. However, apart from employed persons' income contributions
(up to 9% of the taxable income) and farmers (using a formula based on the
estimated uniform rural production), national health insurance can also be
financed with income from bank deposits, donations, legacies, and other
sources indicated in the Act.
6. Id.
7. Under the Universal Health Insurance Act 15 regional health insurance funds (regionalne Kasy
Chorych) and I industry-specific (sectoral) pool (branzowa Kasa Chorych) were established. Universal
Health Insurance Act, Journal of Laws of 1997, No. 28, item 153, as amended. Although they were
modeled on the German Krankenkassen (of a Bismarckian type), some elements of their organizational
structure reflected the configuration of Polish health care during the pre-war period. See M. Nestero-
wicz, E. Bagiihska, A. den Exter, Medical Law Monograph, INT'L ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF L. 65 (2007).
8. Id.
9. Publicly Funded Health Care Services Act of 2004 (Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2004,
No. 210, item 2135 (Pol.)).
10. See M. Nesterowicz, PRAWO MEDYCZNE, 33 (9th ed. 2010).
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In return for the premiums, the insurance scheme provides the insured
and other people entitled by the statute (minors under the age of eighteen
and other family members of the insured, the unemployed, disabled, moth-
ers on maternity leave, veterans, etc.) with a wide range of medical services
that cover nearly all areas of health care (diagnosis, therapy, hospitaliza-
tion, specialist treatment, rehabilitation, as well as sanitary transport, emer-
gency care, and provision of drugs and other medical appliances)." These
services, called standard (guaranteed) procedures, constitute a health care
benefit package, and they are rendered free of charge or in return for partial
payments by health care providers that become participants of the insur-
ance scheme by entering into contracts with the National Health Fund.12
Within the scope of insurance, the insured are also entitled-under certain
conditions-to medical treatment abroadl 3 and to a whole or partial refund
of drugs, medical products, and appliances as well as orthopedic equip-
ment. Highly specialized health care procedures of certain types (e.g. bone
marrow and liver transplantations) are financed directly by the Ministry of
Health. 14
Health care providers which do not participate in the national health
insurance scheme offer medical services for a charge, on a commercial
basis. These "non-standard procedures" are accessible to all patients who
are interested in them, and they play an important role in the overall health
care system, since the accessibility of medical care financed from public
sources is, in practice, limited, particularly for specialized treatment.
2. Civil law, with its compensation mechanisms (instruments), is the
main source of reimbursement for personal injury, with social security
insurance and private health insurance being of secondary importance in
this regard.
Social security insurance has functioned on the grounds of the Social
Security Insurance Act (Ustawa o ubezpieczeniu spolecznym) of October
13, 199815 as a system independent from national health insurance. This
kind of insurance, obligatory for most of the citizens, provides money and
11. See Publicly-Funded Health Care Services Act, supra note 9, art. 15 as amended.
12. The detailed lists of medical services covered by the health care benefit package have been
published in 13 Ordinances of the Ministry of Health of 28-30 August 2009. See Dziennik Ustaw
[Journal of Laws] 2009, No. 139, items 1136-1148 (Pol.). Certain medical services are qualified into a
standard category by the Ministry of Health according to the statutory criteria listed in Article 31 a of the
Law of 2004 and the recommendations of the President of the Agency of Accreditation of Medical
Technologies. See supra note 9, art. 3 1a.
13. See Marcin. Sliwka, PRAWO MEDYCZNE 59-63 (Miroslaw Nesterowicz, ed., 9th ed. 2010)
14. See the Ordinance of Ministry of Health of 13 December 2004, concerning highly specialized
medical procedures financed by the State; see also Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2004, No. 267,
item 2261 (Pol.).
15. Official Journal 2009, No. 205, item 1585 - unified text.
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other assistance in the case of illness, work disability, maternity leave, and
retirement. The benefits are paid by a State entity the Social Security Insur-
ance Administration (Zaklad Ubezpieczeri Spolecznych), which collects
premiums from the insured and administers the scheme.16
Until the introduction of the new health care system in 1999, Poland
had a rather limited experience with private health insurance. At present,
this kind of insurance, governed by the general provisions of the Civil Code
(Article 805 and the following) and the standard terms of insurance, is be-
coming more and more common and gradually grows in importance.17 The
reason for this growth is the relatively low quality of NFZ services and
effectively limited access to public health care, especially to medical ser-
vices rendered by specialists (long "waiting lists" for more sophisticated
treatment).' 8 However, private insurance may (and will) serve solely as a
voluntary supplement as long as national health insurance is obligatory.
Statutory rules would be required to give patients the choice between pub-
lic (national) and private health insurance, since as long as the former is
compulsory, premiums must be paid even if the patient does not make any
use of his or her health care benefit package (when he needs a certain kind
of medical treatment).19
I. GROUNDS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY
1. In the event that damage arises from medical malpractice, civil lia-
bility may be attributed exclusively to the that has performed the treatment,
irrespective of whether it is a participant of the insurance system or not.
There is no possibility to claim compensation from the National
Health Fund, because this institution neither provides health care itself (its
role is limited to purchasing medical services by entering into contracts
with hospitals and doctors) nor it is an owner, co-owner, or a share-holder
of a health care facility. However, as a legal person exercising State (offi-
16. See E. Lechnio-Dziubifiska et. al., UBEZPIECZENIA SPOLECZNE (2011).
17. See K. Policha, B. Wojno Aktualne problemy prywatnych ubezpieczeri zdrowotnych, PRAWO
ASEKURACYJNE 14 (2008).
18. In practice, private voluntary health insurance functions in two alternative forms: as group-
based insurance (common for employers) or an individual health care benefit package. The costs of
such insurance depend on the scope of services covered; the price for a standard packet for one person
may vary from PLN 60 (15 E) to PLN 600 (150 E) per month. According to statistical data, as of the
beginning of 2011 not more than 18% of Poles have entered into a private health insurance contract of
any type. GAZETA METRO, 28 March 2011.
19. A number of bills have been drafted to regulate the status of private health insurance and its
relation to the national health insurance (the latest dating from October 2010). However, none of them
has proposed a free choice between the national and private health insurance. The latter is usually to
serve as a supplementary cover only. See Dominika Sikora, Dodatkowa polisa zdrowotna z ulgq,
GAZETA PRAWNA No. 206 (2837), 21 October 2010.
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cial) authority to ensure and organize health care (in view of Article 68 of
the Polish Constitution), 20 the National Health Fund may be responsible for
damage that results from the lack of proper quality of medical services,
inadequate supervision and control over professionals, improper choice of
insurance scheme participants (hospitals and doctors), lack of medical ser-
vices that should have been contracted, etc. 21 The legal grounds of this
liability are the amended Article 417 of the Civil Code (in force since June
17, 2004),22 which constitutes tortious liability for the unlawful acts and
omissions of all legal persons exercising State authority. Since this is an
objective, risk-based liability, it is not necessary to prove the damage per-
petrator's fault to seek compensation. 23
2. Liability for medical malpractice can be either contractual or tor-
tious. What kind of liability regime is applicable in the circumstances of a
certain case depends on the status of the doctor (the hospital) and the nature
of medical services that have been rendered to a patient.
If health care is provided within the scope of national health insur-
ance, there is no contract between a patient and a hospital or a doctor, since
the source of the provider's obligation toward a patient is statutory provi-
sions (regulations of Publicly-Funded Health Care Services Act of 28 Au-
gust 2004). Consequently, in the case of damage, provisions of ex delicto
liability are applied exclusively (Article 41524 of the Civil Code, which
constitutes liability for the tortfeasor's own acts and omissions, or Article
43025 of the Civil Code, constituting vicarious liability for a fault of a sub-
ordinate). A contract between parties (qualified as a contract of rendering
services to which provisions of Article 750 of the Civil Code are applied) 26
20. Ewa Bagifdska, ODPOWIEDZIALNORt ODSZKODOWAWCZA ZA WYKONYWANIE WLADZY
PUBLICZNEJ, 287 (2006); Miroslaw Nesterowicz, Glosa do wyroku Sqdu Okrqgowego w Lublinie z
4.IV.2002 r. (IC 656/99), [Commentary on the Judgment of the Regional Court in Lublin], PRAwO I
MEDYCYNA 127-128 (2004/3).
21. Bagifiska, supra note 20, at 287; Nesterowicz, supra note 20, at 127-128.
22. Law of 17 June 2004 (Journal of Laws 2004, No. 162, item 1692), amending the Civil Code
(Law of 23 April 1964; Journal of Laws 1964, No. 210, item 2135). Section I of the amended Article
417 states: "The liability for damage caused by an illegal act or omission in the course of the exercise of
public authority rests on the State Treasury, a local authority or any other legal person who exercises an
authority conferred upon it by law." Ewa Bagidska, Poland (Ewa Baginska trans.), in EUROPEAN TORT
LAW: BASIC TEXTS 131 (Ken Oliphant & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2011) (citing Civil Code art. 417
(Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1964) (Pol.)) [hereinafter Bagibska, Pol. Civ. C.].
23. See Bagihska, supra note 20, at 286-287; K. Baczyk-Rozwadowska, supra note 5, at 196.
24. Article 415 states: "Any person who by his fault has caused damage to another person is
obliged to redress it." Bagifiska, Pol. Civ. C., supra note 22, art. 415.
25. Article 430 states: "A person who on his own account entrusts the performance of an act to a
person who at the performance of the act is under his control and has a duty to abide by his instructions
is liable for any damage caused by that person's fault in the course of performance." Id at art. 430.
26. Article 750 states: "The provisions of mandate [Articles 734 - 749] shall apply respectively to
contracts on performance of services not regulated by other provisions." THE POLISH CIVIL CODE., 135
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is concluded only when a patient receives treatment outside the insurance
scheme, at a private clinic or a doctor's office. The breach of that contract
may then give rise to the provider's ex contractu liability (according to
Article 47127 or Article 47428 of the Civil Code).
However, in most malpractice cases provisions of tortious liability are
applied. According to case law and doctrine, a doctor who causes personal
injury (a bodily impairment and/or health disturbance) not only performs
his contractual obligations improperly but, at the same time, acts inconsis-
tently with the general duty of care by which he is bound, regardless of the
legal relationship with a patient.29 Ex contractu liability is then in concur-
rence with tortious liability and, pursuant to Article 443 of the Civil Code,
the injured is entitled to choose legal grounds for seeking indemnity.30 In
practice, patients prefer the ex delicto regime because of the wider scope of
damages, 31 including compensation for a non-pecuniary loss 32 and the sta-
tute of limitations, which is far more convenient for a claimant (especially
after the latest amendment of Article 442' of the Civil Code). 33 The plain-
( 0. A. Wojtasiewicz, trans., D. Kierzkowska, ed., 2000), , [hereinafter 0. A. Wojtasiewicz, The Polish
Civil Code]. Under this contract on performance of services a health care provider is obliged to perform
treatment with due care and diligence required by the medical profession. He then guarantees medical
attention free of faults and mistakes, and is not responsible for failure to achieve a certain result (a
successful treatment or cure). M. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 75. Compare M. Soiniak, CYWILNA
ODPOWIEDZIALNOit LEKARZA, 30 (1st. ed., 1968).
27. Article 471 states: "The debtor shall be obliged to redress the damage resulting from the non-
performance or improper performance of the obligation unless non-performance or improper perfor-
mance were due to the circumstances for which the debtor is not liable." Wojtasiewicz, supra note 26,
at 136.
28. Article 474 states: "The debtor shall be liable, as for his own acts and omissions, for acts and
omissions by the persons with the assistance of whom he performs the obligation, as well as the persons
whom he entrusts with the performance of the obligation. The above provision shall also apply where
the obligation is performed by the statutory representative of the debtor."Id. at 136.
29. In view of doctrine, in the field of medical malpractice contractual duties only strengthen and
reinforce the general duty in tort to respect patients' interest in the integrity of the body. Stefan
Grzybowski, Odpowiedzialno96 cywilna lekarza, ODPOWIEDZIALNOSC CYWILNA ZA WYRZADZENIE
SZKODY 130, 133 (S. Grzybowski, ed., 1969).
30. Article 443 states: "The fact that the act or omission from which the damage arose constituted
the non-performance or the improper performance of a pre-existing obligation does not preclude a claim
for damages in tort, unless the pre-existing obligation provides otherwise." Bagitiska, Pol. Civ. C.,
supra note 22, art. 443; see also the judgment of the Supreme Court of 28 April 1964 (II CR 540/63),
OSPiKA 1965, item 197 and the judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 October 1997 (Ill CKN 202/97),
OSN 1998/3, item 42.
31. See infra note 144.
32. See infra note 144.
33. The Law of 16 February 2007, Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2007, No. 80, item 538 (in
force since 10 August 2007). Section 3 of the amended Article 442' states: "In a personal injury case, a
claim shall not be barred before a period of three years from the date on which the injured learned about
the injury and about the person obliged to redress it." Section 4 states: "The claims of a minor for
redress for damage resulting from personal injury shall not be barred before a period of two years from
the date he obtains the age of majority" which is eighteen years. Bagiiska, Pol. Civ. C., supra note 22,
art. 421.
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tiff's choice of liability provisions is binding on the court (bearing in mind
that only one compensation may be awarded). However, it is not possible
to create a "combined" regime which comprises certain (and most favora-
ble for a claimant) elements of ex contractu and ex delicto liability.34
Civil liability, whether contractual or tortious, may be attributed to a
doctor or a hospital when any of these persons' own (faulty) acts or omis-
sions result in damage. However, it may be also a hospital's vicarious lia-
bility for injuries caused by fault of its doctors or other medical staff.
3.A doctor who works outside the scope of the NFZ insurance and
renders medical services individually, within his own private practice (as
an entrepreneur, within the meaning of the Business Activity Freedom Act
of 2 July 200435), bears civil liability for any damage resulting from his
negligent conduct. Although there is, as a rule, a binding contract between
that doctor and a patient, which gives rise to ex contractu liability (pursuant
to Article 471 of the Civil Code), in the great majority of cases Article 415
of the Civil Code is applied concurrently. A patient may claim damages in
tort even if certain obligations of the doctor laid down in the contract (e.g.,
the duty to pay additional visits, to perform an operation personally without
delegating these tasks to a colleague, etc.) were not fulfilled or fulfilled
improperly, provided the breach of these obligations has caused a personal
injury.
A doctor who runs his individual private practice and employs medi-
cal staff such as assistants, subcontractors, or subordinates (anesthesiolo-
gists, nurses, midwives, laboratory assistants, etc.) is liable for the
misconduct of the members of that staff, regardless of whether the resulting
damage is caused by his own fault. In such cases, liability is objective,
based on the principle of risk pursuant to Article 474 of the Civil Code or
Article 430 (applied concurrently as delictual grounds). Consequently, a
doctor may not be exempt from it by proving that he was diligent selecting
his subordinates or that he exercised proper supervision and control over
the employed staff. However, a patient who suffered the damage must
34. Case law did make several attempts to create such a combination but this solution was finally
disapproved by the Supreme Court. The only possibility is to claim compensation for pecuniary and
non-pecuniary loss on appropriate grounds by means of the concurrence of liability if such a possibility
in casu exists. In the judgment of 17 December 2004 (It CK 300/04), OSP 2006/2, item 20 cmt. by M.
Nesterowicz, the Supreme Court admitted that claiming damages for material loss ex contractu (pur-
suant to Article 471 of the Civil Code) does not exclude the indemnification of pain and suffering (on
the grounds of Article 445 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 443) if the results of the
improperly performed obligation (defective artificial limbs) are so grave for the injured person that they
constitute at the same time a tort as defined by Article 415 of the Civil Code. See also M. Nesterowicz,
Zadog6uczynienie pieniqine ex contractu i przy zbiegu odpowiedzialnoici deliktowej, PATSTWO I
PRAwO 23 (2007/1).
35. Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2007, No. 155, item 1095, art. 4 (Pol.) as amended.
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present the evidence of fault (negligence) of an individual perpetrator (a
certain member of the doctor's personnel) or at least (as far as Article 430
is concerned) prove the existence of the so-called anonymous fault (fault by
an unidentified person). 36
4.In the case where a doctor does not work individually but renders
medical services in a health care facility, it is necessary to establish wheth-
er he performs treatment on the grounds of a contract of employment (as a
hospital's employee 37 within the meaning of Article 2 of the Labour
Code 38) or pursuant to a civil law contract (as a so-called independent con-
tractor). The distinction is important, because if damage arises from medi-
cal malpractice, different provisions are applied and liability may be
attributed to different persons.
4.1. A doctor who works as a hospital's employee is protected under
the provisions of the Labour Code. He is then not individually liable for the
damage inflicted on patients in the course of treatment and due to his fault
(so-called employee immunity, Article 120 § 1 of the Labour Code).39
Consequently, the injured person can pursue his claims only against the
health care facility (the doctor's employer, irrespective of whether it is a
public hospital, a doctor's cooperative, a medical center, or a private clin-
ic), which is obliged to redress the damage (in full) according to the provi-
sions of the Civil Code. The doctor who caused the damage does not act as
a party in the lawsuit and he may appear in the court (if ever) only as a
witness presenting evidence of the circumstances of the case.40 As case law
provides, the exclusion of the doctor's liability towards the patient extends
also to the claims of the insurance company, which cannot recourse the
36. Gerard Bieniek, KOMENTARZ DO KODEKSU CYWILNEGO. KSIEGA TRZECIA. ZOBOWIAZANIA.
TOM 1 344 (G. Bieniek, ed., 2002). For discussion of the concept of anonymous fault, see infra notes
99-103.
37. Pursuant to Article 44a of the Health Care Institutions Act, an employment relationship is
obligatory for doctors-principals of a hospital and heads of a hospital. However, these doctors usually
work as employees only part-time, while during the rest of the working time they render medical ser-
vices as independent contractors. This situation creates difficulties, since in the case of damage inflicted
on a patient it may be difficult to establish which of the two capacities of the doctor will be the legal
basis for the case against him. See M. Nesterowicz, Odpowiedzialnogd cywilna zakladu opieki
zdrowotnej za lekarzajako podwiadnego, PAI STWO I PRAwo 4 (2008/9).
38. Law of 26 June 1974, Journal of Laws No. 24, item 141.
39. The same rules are applied for doctors who render health care as functionaries (in a function-
based relationship) in the armed forces, in the police, or in the prison medical service. M. Nesterowicz,
supra note 36, at 125.
40. This solution has been criticized by doctrine as being disadvantageous (and, as it is pointed
out, unfair) for the injured. See M. Nesterowicz, Odpoviedzialno9d cywilna za dzialania zespoldw
lekarskich, MATERIALY SYMPOZJUM NAUKOWEGO PRAWO A MEDYCYNA U PROGU XXI w. 50 ( M.
Filar, ed., 1987).
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doctor for the sums paid to the injured person on the grounds of Article 828
§ I of the Civil Code (cessio legis).4 1
In the majority of malpractice cases, the injured persons are reim-
bursed on the grounds of Article 430 of the Civil Code, which constitutes
the hospital's objective (risk-based) liability for damage caused by fault
(negligence) of a subordinate doctor.42 However, if medical care was ren-
dered on a contractual basis, outside the scope of the NFZ insurance, it is
also possible to claim damages from a hospital ex contractu, pursuant to
Article 474 of the Civil Code.
The health care facility which has indemnified the injury (whether on
the grounds of Article 430 or Article 474 of the Civil Code) acquires the
right of recourse to the doctor. The recourse may be claimed if all premises
of the tortfeasor's liability are met, in particular the employee's fault and
the extent of the patient's damage (Article 116 of the Labour Code). How-
ever, the scope of recourse is limited to a maximum of the threefold
monthly remuneration of the employee (Article 119 of the Labour Code).
The right to full recourse, which comprises the entire damage, may arise
only when the injury was inflicted intentionally, 43 when the doctor acted
outside the course of treatment (without a functional connection to the ex-
ecution of his vocational dutieS44), and when the hospital is insolvent or
improperly insured (Article 122 of the Labour Code)45.
In the aforementioned situations the restitutional function of compen-
sation and the protection of the employer's (hospital's) interest in being
reimbursed prevails over the necessity to safeguard the property of an em-
ployee. In order to be successful in claiming recourse (whether limited or
41. See the resolution of the Supreme Court of 7 November 1977 (111 CZP 80/77); OSN 1978/5 -
6, item 84. The Supreme Court ruled that the Labour Code is a special act introducing employee protec-
tion separate from the Civil Code, and Article 828 of the Civil Code, which constitutes the insuring
party's right assignment, is not applied thereto.
42. In view of doctrine and case law, the relation of superiority (dependency) between the health
care institution and the doctor exists, even though the latter is independent from a hospital as far as the
professional sphere of medical activity (diagnosis and therapy) is concerned. See Baczyk-
Rozwadowska, supra note 5, at 189. Compare the judgment of the District Court in Lublin of 4 April
2002 (1 C 656/99), PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 184 (2004/3), cmt. by M. Nesterowicz; the judgment of the
Supreme Court of 13 December 2007 (1 CSK 384/07), OSP 2009/2, item 20; and the judgment of the
Appellate Court in Lublin of 4 March 2009 (1 ACa 12/09), unreported.
43. As case law provides, damage caused by intentional fault is hardly ever a case in the field of
medical malpractice. It may appear, e.g. when a doctor refuses to treat or to admit to a hospital a patient
in an emergency situation. See M. Nesterowicz, KONTRAKTOWA I DELIKTOWA ODPOWIEDZIALNOk
LEKARZA ZA ZABIEG LECZNICZY, 85 (1972).
44. See the judgment of the Supreme Court of 11 October 2007 (IV CSK 174/07), Przeglad
Sadowy 2008/9, 34
45. See also the resolution of the Supreme Court (in a panel of seven judges) of 7 June 1975 (I
CZP 19/75), OSN 1976, item 20 and the judgment of the Supreme Court of II April 2008 (11 CSK
618/07), ZDP 2009, item 41.
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full), a hospital must present all the facts that prove the doctor's liability (in
particular negligence or another kind of his unintentional fault), demon-
strate the scope of the damage and establish the causal link between that
damage and the doctor's negligent improper (faulty) conduct. Obviously, if
an individual perpetrator cannot be found or if it is impossible to establish
his identity (e.g., in the case of anonymous fault), no recourse is possible.
In practice, recourse claims (or suits) are very rare. Damages are
usually paid to the injured person by the insurance company that a hospital
has entered into a contract with, so there are in fact no grounds for re-
course. On the other hand, if a health care provider itself indemnifies the
injury, the matter of recourse is usually settled between the parties (the
employer and the employee) by means of an out-of-court agreement (unless
the employer has renounced the pursuance of this limited indemnity at all).
This solution is particularly favorable for the doctor, who may then have
his indemnity reduced. Such a reduction is usually made after consideration
of all circumstances of the case, in particular the economic status of the
doctor, his family's living conditions, as well as his attitude towards pro-
fessional tasks and obligations. However, the refund a doctor is obliged to
pay may not be reduced if the damage was caused intentionally or when the
doctor was convicted by a criminal court (with a final verdict) for not fulfil-
ling (neglecting) his vocational duties..46
4.2. A doctor who performs treatment in a health care facility on the
grounds of a civil law contract (which may be a contract of rendering ser-
vices within the meaning of Article 750 of the Civil Code or a contract of
granting an order to perform treatment regulated by Article 35 Sections 1-4
of the Health Care Institutions Act of August 31, 1991) is not protected
under the provisions of the Labour Code. Consequently, he bears civil lia-
bility for any damage inflicted on patients in the course of treatment, pur-
suant to Article 415 of the Civil Code. Liability of an independent
contractor is joint and several with the health care institution with which
the doctor has concluded a contract, pursuant to Article 441 Section 1 of
the Civil Code47 or Article 35 Section 5 of the Health Care Institutions Act
(for contracts of granting an order to perform treatment48).49 As case law
provides, it is not possible for a doctor to prove in the malpractice suit that
46. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 126.
47. Section I of Article 441 states: "If several persons are liable for damage caused by a tort, their
liability is joint and several." Bagihska Pol. Civ. C., supra note 22, art. 441.
48. These contracts are concluded by doctors with a public health care facility as a subcontract to
the main contract between the facility and the National Health Fund. Bqczyk-Rozwadowska, supra note
5, at 145.
49. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 67.
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he contributed to the existence or emergence of damage to a lower or great-
er extent than the other joint tortfeasor (a hospital or another doctor.50
Since Article 441 of the Civil Code (as a ius cogens mandatory provision)
accepts no exceptions to the joint and several liability, each of the defen-
dants (tortfeasors) should be ready to compensate all the damage sustained
by the patient (however, with the right to recourse after the injured is fully
reimbursed).51
In the case of multiplication of possible defendants, patients usually
proceed against a health care institution since that sort of party (debtor)
makes recovery easier than an individual perpetrator. The institution's re-
course against the individual perpetrator is subject to the provisions of the
Civil Code, and its scope depends on the circumstances of a given case.
Full recourse is possible when damages are paid by a hospital which in-
demnifies the patient, in spite of the lack of its fault, provided the injury
was caused by fault or another kind of negligence on the part of the doctor
(Article 441 § 3 of the Civil Code). 52 However, if the damage resulted from
the improper conduct of both a doctor (who, e.g., performed an operation
negligently) and the health care institution (which, e.g., did not provide the
doctor with the adequate surgical equipment) and only the latter redressed
the injury in full, it may demand from the doctor the refund of an appropri-
ate part according to the fault of that person and the extent to which he
contributed to the emergence of the damage (Article 441 § 2 of the Civil
Code). 53
5. Liability of a health care provider may arise in the case where the
damage is inflicted on a patient as a result of the improper organization or
mistakes in the functioning of a hospital itself. Circumstances of that kind
constitute the so-called organizational fault (wina organizacyjna), which,
as a legal person's own fault, shall not be attributed to a certain member of
medical staff (in particular, a doctor) but to the entire health care institu-
50. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 2 December 1970 (11 CR 542/70), OSN 1971, item 153
and the judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 August 1978 (I CZP 48/78), OSN 1979/4, item 64
51. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 2 December 1970 (II CR 542/70), OSN 1971, item 153
and the judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 August 1978 (III CZP 48/78), OSN 1979/4, item 64.
Compare Bieniek, supra note 36, at 398-399.
52. Section 3 of Article 441 states: "A person who redresses the damage for which he is liable in
spite of the absence of fault has a right of recourse against the perpetrator if the damage occurred due to
the latter's fault." Bagidska, Pol. Civ. C., supra note 23, art. 441.
53. Section 2 of Article 441 states: "If the damage resulted from acts or omissions of several
persons, the person who redresses the damage may demand reimbursement from the others of the
appropriate part depending on the circumstances of the case, in particular the fault of the given person
and the degree to which the latter contributed to the occurrence of the damage." Bagidska, Pol. Civ. C.,
supra note 22, art. 441.
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tion.54 Consequently, the legal grounds for a hospital's liability are, as a
rule, Article 415 of the Civil Code (or, less often, Article 416 of the Civil
Code if damage is caused by fault of a legal person's agency 55 ), in concur-
rence with Article 471 when the patient was treated on a commercial basis,
outside the scope of the insurance scheme (Article 443 of the Civil Code).
As case law provides, the improper organization or malfunctioning of
a hospital may appear in many forms.
First, the health care provider can bear liability for a failure to provide
patients with a "safe hospital stay." 56 The hospital should then take all ne-
cessary precautions to ensure the expected hygiene and safety standards to
prevent risks of any harm. Furthermore, hospital facilities and furnishing
ought to be designed in the way that prevents accidents, like slipping on a
wet floor or falling off a hospital bed or operating table.57 According to
case law, the scope of the duty to provide a safe stay depends on the type of
health care facility as well as the patient's health condition. For example, a
mental hospital is obliged to take special precautions to ensure the total
care to the unconscious and mentally disturbed patients to prevent them
from injuring themselves (the judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 No-
vember 1969, II CR 294/69)58 and third parties (other patients, visitors to
the hospital, and passers-by; pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme
Court of 15 June 1981, I CR 174/81).59
The duty to provide a safe hospital stay also includes protecting pa-
tients from infections (such as hepatitis B and C, the HIV-virus, staphylo-
coccus, etc.) which may be acquired in connection with the treatment
54. As of I January 1999 (in consequence of the reform of the health care system) public health
care providers (samodzielne publiczne zaklady opieki zdrowotnej) were granted legal personality and
they may bear their own responsibility. Liability for damage incurred in private hospitals may be attri-
buted to a person or institution that runs the hospital (as its founding entity), e.g. a partnership, founda-
tion, legal or physical person, or a religious union. Bqczyk-Rozwadowska, supra note 5 at 124; see also
U. Drozdowska, Problemaryka odpowiedzialnoici cywilnej zakladdw opieki zdrowotnej - sybrane
zagadnienia, RADCA PRAWNY 22 (2002/3).
55. See the judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 V 2005 (1 CK 662/04), OSP 2009/12, item 134
and the judgment of the District Court in Szczecin of 26 April 2007 (11 CSK 2/07), OSP 2009/1, item 6.
56. According to statistical data, injuries caused by a failure to provide patients with a safe hospit-
al stay result in ten percent of all malpractice suits. Adam Makosz, Szpitale placq coraz wiqcej za blqdy
lekarskie, GAZETA PRAWNA, (July 13, 2010).
57. M Nesterowicz, Odpowiedzialno.d cywilna zakladu leczniczego za bezpieczeristwo pacjenta
podczas hospitalizacji, PANSTWO I PRAWO 40 (2001/3).
58. OSPiKA 1970, item 249. This case concerned a patient who, due to the lack of a proper
supervision of the hospital's staff, managed to jump out of the window and suffered serious injuries. It
is important to mention that such behavior was not qualified by the court as a patient's contribution to
the damage. See also the judgment of the Appellate Court in Poznai of 28 June 1995 (1 ACr 39/95),
OSA 1996/7-8, item 36. In this case a patient, who had previously manifested suicidal tendencies, was
able to leave hospital on his own and to bring about his death by a train.
59. OSPiKA 1982/11, item 188. This case concerned a mentally disturbed patient who had arbitra-
rily left hospital and inflicted damage on a passer-by.
[ Vol 86:31228
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN POLAND
(nosocomial infections). 60 The health care provider is then obliged to main-
tain the sufficient conditions of the hygiene and asepsis to avoid transmit-
ting contagious diseases and spreading bacteria. 61 This duty includes the
use of properly sterilized equipment and appliances, 62 as well as separating
those who are infected or who might be carriers of certain viruses from the
rest of the patients treated in the same ward (department). 63 In the judgment
of the Supreme Court of December 14, 1973 (II CR 692/73),64 a hospital
was found liable for the damage suffered by a patient who had had his
wound infected after surgery (cyst removal). In the court's opinion, the
injury (gaseous gangrene) was due to the breach of hygiene standards by
the medical personnel who had not dressed the wound in the treatment
room but in the sick room, where there had been other patients suffering
from serious bacterial infections. Furthermore, the hospital's ward was
overcrowded and not cleaned properly (with dirt, dust, and insects in the
sick rooms) to provide a safe treatment. 65 In another judgment of July 10,
1998 (I CKN 786/97),66 the Supreme Court admitted that infecting a pa-
tient with a contagious disease (hepatitis B) at the defendant's hospital
proves that the latter failed to provide this patient with a safe hospital stay.
Omission as such constituted negligence for which a hospital was liable on
the grounds of Article 415 of the Civil Code. The duty to provide safe
treatment also extended to prevention of hospital-acquired infections.
Secondly, a hospital may be responsible for injuries which result from
the use of faulty and defective medical equipment. In the judgment of May
11, 1983 (IV CR 118/83),67 the Supreme Court ruled that a health care
facility was obliged to take special care of its apparatuses, surgical instru-
ments, and other treatment appliances so that they would not be dangerous
60. Nosocomial infections are still a great problem for Polish hospitals, since they concern around
24% of all malpractice suits. Adam Makosz, supra note 56. According to statistical data, in the late
1990's, 60% of adult patients and 80% of minors under the age of two were infected with hepatitis B at
hospitals. W. Magdzik, Wirusowe zapalenie wqtroby typu ,,B" jako zakaienie szpitalne,
PROFILAKTYKA I ZWALCZANIE ZAKAZEN SZPITALNYCH, MATERIALY SYMPOZJUM KIEROWNICZEJ
KADRY MEDYCZNEJ 15 (1997).
61. See the judgment of the Appellate Court in Krak6w of 14 October 1992 (1 ACr 374/92), OSA
1992, item 44.
62. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 28 October 1983 (II CR 358/83), OSPiKA 1984, item
187.
63. The judgment of the Appellate Court in Wroclaw of 28 April 1998 (1 ACa 308/98), PRAWO i
MEDYCYNA 147 (2002/12) cmt. by M. Nesterowicz.
64. OSPiKA 1975, item 94.
65. See also the judgment of the Appellate Court in Lublin of 2 May 2006 (1 C 496/04, unre-
ported), concerning a newborn infected with septicaemia (sepsis) due to failure to observe hygiene
requirements at the defendant's hospital.
66. Unreported.
67. OSN 1983/12, item 201. This case concerned a patient who had suffered serious burns as a
result of the use of a defective electric knife during lung surgery.
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either for patients or for the operating team. Therefore, it is necessary for a
hospital to undergo periodical check-ups of all equipment, carried out by
professional service providers. Moreover, doctors are obliged to exercise
ad hoc control before each use of the apparatus and medical instruments in
order to find any visible defects or faults that may cause an injury.68 How-
ever, liability of a hospital may not arise if the damage inflicted on a patient
results from latent defects that came into being during the manufacturing
process (due to faulty construction or use of improper materials) and the
doctor who was applying the equipment could not have detected the defects
and, consequently, could not have avoided the injury, in spite of being care-
ful and diligent.69 Injuries of that kind should be, as a rule, indemnified by
the producer, importer, or professional seller of the medical equipment,
pursuant to Article 4491 of the Civil Code, which constitutes a strict prod-
uct liability regime. 70
Thirdly, a health care facility may be responsible for the damage
caused by an unjustified refusal to admit a patient to the hospital and the
delay in rendering necessary medical care (only if, by means of immediate
help, the injury could have been avoided) as well as for injuries resulting
from lack of a sufficient number of properly qualified doctors (anesthesiol-
ogist, surgeons, etc.) and other members of medical personnel (nurses,
midwives, laboratory assistants, etc.). The rule is that a hospital, whether
public or private, cannot (and has no right to) refuse the treatment and care
if a patient requires immediate assistance because of an emergency situa-
tion in which his health or life is threatened (Article 7 of the Institutional
Health Care Providers Act). In the judgment of December 11, 2002 (I CKN
1386/00),71 the Supreme Court explained that a refusal to treat a patient and
perform a medically justified and necessary operation in a public hospital
cannot be a free decision of a doctor. In the court's opinion, such a refusal
should always be confirmed by a specialist in the respective field of medi-
cine and described in detail in the patient's medical record. Otherwise, the
hospital may be responsible not only for a further deterioration of the pa-
68. See the judgment of the District Court in Lublin of 4 April 2002 (1 C 656/99), PRAWO I
MEDYCYNA 122 (2004/3), cmt. by M. Nesterowicz (concerning a patient who suffered serious burns to
his feet and tissue necrosis as a result of the use of a faulty thermophore after a kidney operation). See
also Kinga Bqczyk-Rozwadowska, Odpowiedzialno96 cywilna za szkody wyrzqdzone pacjentom w
zwiqzku z u±yciem wadliwego lub niesprawnego sprzqtu medycznego, PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 57
(2002/11).
69. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 378.
70. There is a proposal in the doctrine that a hospital should be attributed strict liability (pursuant
to Article 4491 of the Civil Code) for all damages caused by defective equipment, however with the
right of recourse to the manufacturer or seller of that equipment. Id.
71. Reported in the electronic version - LEX 75348.
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tient's health but also for the lack of improvement (losing the chance of
improvement) which could have appeared if he had been given the neces-
sary treatment.
Fourthly, an improper organization of a hospital may consist of "tech-
nical" faults and mistakes that cause the damage. According to case law
and doctrine, an example may be an erroneous identification of a patient
which results in performing the treatment (surgery) on a wrong person. In
the judgment of 10 December 1952 (C 584/52),72 the Supreme Court found
a hospital liable for the injury suffered by a patient who had mistakenly had
her uterus removed instead of having her uterine cervix sutured following
rupture during delivery (which was a routine treatment). The court held that
the injury resulted from the improper organization of the hospital, in par-
ticular from the mistakes of both a nurse who had prepared and brought the
wrong person to the operating room as well as a doctor who had failed to
verify the patient's identity, examine her, or check the medical records
before a sophisticated operation. Another example of a technical mistake
that may give rise to hospital liability for improper functioning is a disorder
(disarray) in medical records which resulted in a long-term, compulsory,
and burdensome treatment of a patient who, in fact, did not suffer from
tuberculosis but had been mistakenly handed the results of another patient's
diagnostic test by a member of the hospital's staff and then treated as a
person suffering from it (the judgment of the Supreme Court of 4 July
1969, PR 179/69).73
6. Civil liability of health care providers coexists with civil liability
(third party) insurance. Since 2007, this insurance has been obligatory for
all health care providers (whether public or private hospitals, doctors, or
other members of medical staff) that render medical services on the
grounds of contracts concluded with the National Health Fund (pursuant to
Article 136 (b) of the Publicly-Funded Health Care Services Act). Liability
insurance is also compulsory for independent contractors who render health
care in hospitals pursuant to contracts of granting an order to perform
treatment on the grounds of Article 35 of the Institutional Health Care Pro-
viders Act. In each of the aforementioned cases, liability insurance is a
necessary premise (a prerequisite) of entering into a contract to perform
treatment and, consequently, becoming a participant of the health insurance
72. PANSTWOIPRAWO 366 (1953/8-9).
73. OSN 1970, item 71 cmt. by M. Nesterowicz.
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scheme. The scope and conditions of both kinds of insurance are regulated
in a detailed manner in the Ordinances of the Minister of Finance. 74
An even newer solution is compulsory liability insurance for all doc-
tors that render medical services in Poland pursuant to the amended Article
48(b) of the Physician's and Dentist's Professions Act (Ustawa o zawodach
lekarza i lekarza dentysty) of December 5, 199675). Since January 1, 2010,
these doctors have been obliged to have insurance coverage, irrespective of
whether they run an individual or a group private practice (in a form of a
partnership, doctors' cooperative, etc.) or work in a public or private health
care facility (a hospital, medical centre, clinic, etc.). The only exceptions
are doctors who render medical services exclusively on the grounds of a
contract of employment as employees within the meaning of the Labour
Code (Article 48(b) Section 2 of the Physician's and Dentist's Professions
Act). As previously mentioned, they do not bear civil liability for the dam-
age inflicted on patients in the course of treatment, and Article 120 of the
Labour Code provides them with sufficient legal protection.76
The scope and terms of the new liability insurance are regulated in a
detailed manner in the Ordinance of Minister of Finance of 26 April
2010.77 According to its provisions, the insurance covers all injuries in-
flicted on patients due to the faulty acts and omissions of an insured doctor,
provided the damage is caused in the course of treatment and within the
doctor's vocational duties (§ I of the Ordinance). 78 There is no possibility
for an insurance company to limit its duty to pay indemnities in the insur-
ance contract (§ 2 point 3 of the Ordinance). The minimum insurance sums
have been established with respect to the types of medical specialization. 79
74. See the Ordinance of 23 December 2004 (concerning compulsory liability insurance of health
care providers concluding contacts of granting an order to perform treatment). Journal of Laws 2004,
No. 283, item 2825; see also the Ordinance of 28 December 2007 (concerning compulsory liability
insurance of health care providers). Journal of Laws 2008, No. 3, item 10.
75. Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2008, No. 136, item 857 (Pol.). Article 48b was amended
by the new Law on Medical Chambers of 2 December 2009 (Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2009,
No. 219, item 1708).
76. The Announcement of the Secretary of State M. Twardowski of 25 January 2010 (concerning
the compulsory liability insurance of doctors who render medical services exclusively on the grounds of
a contract of employment).
77. Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2010, No. 78, item 515 (Pol.). The Ordinance came into
force on 12 June 2010.
78. The exclusions of the insurer's liability, enumerated in § 2 points 1-4 of the Ordinance, con-
cern e.g. injuries to property, injuries resulting from contractual indemnities a doctor is obliged to pay,
injuries inflicted on patients after the suspension of the right to perform treatment, and injuries resulting
from vis maior incidents and acts of terror. Id.
79. The minimum insurance sums are as follows: the PLN equivalence of 100,000 E for doctors
who specialize in oncology and clinical oncology, anesthesiology, gynecology and obstetrics, intensive
care, urology, neurology, laryngology and otolaryngology, emergency medicine, ophthalmology; the
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The idea of obligatory insurance for all health care providers is of sig-
nificant importance and should not be underestimated. Since currently all
doctors and institutional health care providers, both participants and non-
participants of the health insurance scheme, have coverage, the goal to
provide patients and health care professionals with a sufficient protection
(offered by complex liability insurance) seems to have been achieved.
II. LIABILITY BASED ON FAULT
1. In all fields of medical malpractice, civil liability is based on fault.
As previously mentioned, fault may be a necessary premise of a doctor's or
hospital's liability for their own acts and omissions which cause the dam-
age. If fault is committed by a member of medical staff (in particular, a
doctor), it may constitute a prerequisite of that hospital's vicarious liability,
even when it appears in its objective-like form of the so-called anonymous
fault.
Fault usually consists of negligence (niedbalstwo), which is defined as
failure to work with due care and diligence while treating a patient. The
doctor's conduct is negligent if, according to the current state of medical
knowledge, a doctor has not exercised due care required by the profes-
sion.80 Apart from negligence, fault may involve any kind of carelessness,
lack of skill, inadequate attentiveness, imprudence, or insufficient know-
ledge. The study of case law proves that a doctor's or hospital's fault may,
in particular, consist of performing an obviously unnecessary operation or
treatment81 ; rendering medical care without required qualifications, unless
there is an emergency situation (the judgment of the Supreme Court of
October 9, 1945, C 1188/4582); prescribing improper drugs (the judgment
of the Supreme Court of 3 December 195883); leaving surgical instruments
in the patient's body after an operation (the judgment of the Supreme Court
of 25 February 1972; II CR 610/7184); or omitting necessary care or diag-
nostic tests (the judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 March 2006; IV CSK
80/8585). In the judgment of 29 September 2000 (V CKN 527/2000),86 the
PLN equivalence of 50,000 E for dentists and dental surgeons; and the equivalent of 25,000 E for re-
maining doctors.
80. B. Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska, Wina lekarza i zakladu opieki zdrowotnej jako przeslanka
odpowiedzialnoici za szkody wyrzqdzone przy leczeniu, PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 125 (1999/1); M.
Soiniak, supra note 26, at 122; M. Nesterowicz, Kontraktowa, supra note 43, at 84.
81. The judgment of the Supreme Court of December 10, 1952, C 584/52.
82. Zbi6r Orzecznictwa SN 1945-46, item 18.
83. PfsTwo I PRAwo 200 (1960/1).
84. Nowe Prawo 1349 (1973/9). The case concerned a patient, who had suffered an injury as a
result of a small piece of bone forceps being left in his skull (epicranium) after a brain operation.
85. OSP 2007/1, item 11.
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Supreme Court held that it was a doctor's fault to have accidentally severed
a healthy organ (common hepatic duct) during an operation in the abdo-
minal cavity (a removal of chollecystis). The rule is that damage as such
may not burden a patient and cannot be treated as a risk which a patient
accepts while giving his valid consent to surgery (the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of 9 January 1971, 11 CR 421/71).87
The standard of due care is objective in nature, oriented towards what
is expected in medicine as required at the time of the treatment.88 In prac-
tice, the courts in medical malpractice suits establish the scope of doctor
duties and the desired standard of care (which is an abstract model of an
experienced, diligent doctor of a respective medical discipline) and com-
pare it to the conduct in question, taking into consideration all relevant
circumstances of the given case, like the time and place of performing the
treatment, the urgency of the procedure, the condition of the patient, etc.89
The required duty of care is then related to medical specialization. There-
fore a specialist-standard ought to be applied if any doctor (whether an
expert in a certain field of medicine or not) undertakes treatment requiring
specialized knowledge and skills, unless there is a case of emergency. 90
The standard of care has been set at a high level because of the profes-
sional nature of doctor and hospital activity (according to Article 355 § 2 of
the Civil Code, which requires higher diligence standards from all profes-
sionals) and the object of this activity, which are the most precious human
interests such as human health and life. In the judgment of October 29,
2003 (III CK 34/02)91 the Supreme Court stated that a doctor was obliged
to perform treatment in accordance with the highest due care that could be
required from a professional in view of current medical knowledge. The
doctor's fault may then consist in a failure to exercise the highest diligence
that is possible in the course of certain medical procedures and treatment of
the diseases of particular types (the judgment of the Appellate Court in
Krak6w of October 12, 2007, I ACa 920/07).92
As case law also points out, the standard of care that medical profes-
sionals should observe ought to be the highest possible since the conse-
86. OSN 2001/3, item 42.
87. M. Nesterowicz, PRAWO MEDYCZNE 45 (7th ed., 2005).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See the judgment of the Supreme Court of 9 October 1945 (C I 188/45), Zbi6r Orzecznictwa
1945-46, item 18. In this case a patient died after having haematoma removed by gynecologist instead
of a qualified surgeon. The court found the operation unnecessary and medically unjustified since there
had existed some other, less radical, ways to treat haematoma.
91. OSP 2005/4, item 6.
92. PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 124 (2010/1).
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quences of a doctor's conduct may be serious, far-reaching, and sometimes
irreversible (the judgment of the Appellate Court in Krak6w of March 9,
2001, I ACa 124/0193). It is then irrelevant whether the source of the doc-
tor's obligation to perform treatment is a contract or a statutory provision.
A duty to observe high standards of care is always the same (identical in
content), because a patient is at all times entitled to professional care based
on the standard of an experienced physician in a respective medical discip-
line. Also, financial considerations cannot modify this duty, because once
the doctor-patient relationship exists, it remains the same whether the ser-
vices are rendered gratuitously or for an ordinary payment. 94 However, the
requirements to observe high standards of care cannot lead to the imposi-
tion on doctors such duties that are impossible to be performed in practice.
In view of case law and doctrine, this solution would mean the doctor's sui
generis liability based on the principle of risk, which obviously contradicts
the nature of the medical profession (the judgment of the Appellate Court
in Warszawa of March 3, 1998; I ACa 14/98).95
Fault usually exists in a form of negligence, but it may also appear as
gross negligence. 96 As case law provides, dolus [intent] (whether directus
[purpose] or eventualis [knowledge of consequences]) appears but sporadi-
cally in medical malpractice suits. In the doctrine, a distinction is also made
between fault which concerns medical aspects of a doctor's activity (e.g.,
lack of sufficient knowledge and skills, imprudence and negligence) and
fault of another kind (lack of a proper supervision over the patient, an un-
justified refusal to render medical services, performing treatment without
the patient's consent, etc.). 97 However, as a rule, a certain degree of fault or
its type does not have to be proved, since culpa levissima (the slightest
fault) is sufficient to attribute liability to either a doctor and a hospital in
the ex delicto regime.98 On the other hand, in the case of ex contractu lia-
bility, any contractual exclusion of intentional fault is invalid, pursuant to
93. Przegla4d Sadowy 132 (2002/10).
94. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 86.
95. Wokanda 1998, item 10. In this case, a newborn who had suffered from pneumonia was
infected with hepatitis B during his blood transfusion. The defendant's hospital proved its due diligence
by showing that the blood for the plaintiff had been purchased from a blood donation centre, stored in
accordance with all necessary procedures and transfused with sterile, single-use equipment by qualified
medical staff. The court admitted that an omission to check the blood's quality could not constitute the
hospital's fault (negligence) because the donation centre was obliged to supply "safe blood", free of
viruses. However, compensation was granted on the grounds of the principle of rightness (boni mores)
and equity, pursuant to Article 419 of the Civil Code, derogated in 2004.
96. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 22 March 1973 (I CR 73/73), unreported; Miroslaw
Nesterowicz, Commentary on the judgment of the Appellate Court in Lublin of 1 February 2006 (I C
213/04), PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 128 (2009/4).
97. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 81.
98. B. Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska, supra note 80, at 125.
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Article 473 § 2 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, any stipulation which limits
a doctor's or hospital's liability for negligence (culpa levis) should be
deemed null and void as contrary to law and the principles of rightness
(boni mores) and equity (zasady slusznoci) on the grounds of Article 58
§ 2, Article 353' and Article 3853 point 2 of the Civil Code.
2. Since fault is a subjective premise of civil liability, proving it re-
quires a thorough analysis of an individual perpetrator's decision concern-
ing his unlawful conduct (an act or omission). In particular, a court should
verify whether a doctor could have avoided causing damage if he had per-
formed the treatment with due care and diligence required in the circums-
tances.99 However, in the field of medical malpractice, a prerequisite of
fault may be fulfilled even if the subjective fault mentioned above is miss-
ing. According to the theory of anonymous fault (wina anonimowa), in the
case where it is impossible to determine the damage perpetrator for whom a
hospital is vicariously liable, the latter may be attributed liability provided
that the damage has been caused by negligence of an unidentified member
of the hospital's staff (a doctor, a nurse, a laboratory assistant, etc.).oo
Since in such cases fault is assumed without identifying damage perpetra-
tor, evidence of unlawfulness of a certain medical conduct is effectively
sufficient to claim damages.' 0 '
The concept of anonymous fault is of significant importance because
it simplifies proof of fault for those plaintiffs who otherwise could have
serious problems with receiving due indemnity. Therefore, anonymous
fault is applied relatively often in medical malpractice cases. In the judg-
ment of December 29, 1993 (I C 298/92)102 the District Court in Byd-
goszcz found a hospital liable for injury suffered by a patient who had been
infected with hepatitis B due to a failure to observe requirements of hy-
giene by one of its doctors, whose identity could not be established. In the
court's opinion, the impossibility to identify the damage perpetrator could
not release the hospital from liability (on the grounds of Article 430 of the
Civil Codel03) if it was proved that negligence had existed and resulted in
the emergence of that damage. Therefore, it was not relevant which of the
99. Id.
100. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 371; see also the judgment of the District Court in Bydgoszcz
of 29 December 1993 (IC 298/92), unreported.
101. M. Safjan, PRAWO I MEDYCYNA. OCHRONA PRAW JEDNOSTKI A DYLEMATY WSP6LCZESNEJ
MEDYCYNY 85 (1998).
102. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 371.
103. Bieniek Commentary 2002, supra note 36, at 343.
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doctors had been culpable, provided that the injury had been causally con-
nected with a failure to neglect the professional duties. 104
3.In the field of medical malpractice a distinction is made between
fault and medical error (or, more precisely, error in the medical art os).
Both case law and doctrine have defined medical error narrowly, as con-
duct concerning the professional sphere of a physician's activity, which is
diagnosis and therapy inconsistent with medical knowledge accessible to
the doctor at the time of treatment (the judgment of the Supreme Court of I
April 1955, IV CR 39/54).106 A misconduct which involves other areas of
the doctor's performance (different from diagnosis and therapy) cannot be
deemed as error. As case law provides, an example is leaving medical in-
struments in the patient's body after an operation, a breach of requirements
of hygiene and asepsis, using defective medical equipment, exposing a
patient to an excessive dose of X-ray radiation, mistakes in medical records
and documentation, and mistakes in the results of diagnostic testS. 107 How-
ever, misconduct as such may also give rise to civil liability of a doctor or
hospital if all premises of that liability have been in casu fulfilled.108
Error in the art of medicine in the aforementioned, narrow, meaning is
an objective category (as some authors point out-an objective component
of faultl 09), which does not refer to a person who commits it or to the cir-
cumstances of the given case. As such, error does not determine the pro-
vider's liability per se. If the doctor is to be made liable, his wrongdoing
should be, at the same time, negligent. In the case where there is no negli-
gence, liability for error may not arise, even if damage exists and is causal-
ly connected with the doctor's improper conduct. In view of case law, there
are, in particular, no grounds for the doctor's liability if a healthy patient,
104. Compare the judgment of Supreme Court of 26 May 1994 (II CRN 244/94), unreported; see
also the judgment of the Supreme Court of 21 November 1974 (II CR 638/74), OSPiKA 1975, item 108
and the judgment of Supreme Court 17 April 1974 (11 CR 13/74), OSPiKA 1974, item 207, adjudicated
on the grounds of art. 417 of the Civil Code (in the wording preceding the amendment of 17 June 2004).
105. There is an ongoing dispute in doctrine concerning the notion of error. See Kinga B4czyk-
Rozwadowska, Blqd lekarski w Swietle doktryny i orzecznictwa sqdowego, PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 5
(2009/3). Compare M. Nesterowicz, Kontraktowa, supra note 43, at 78; Agnieszka LISZEWSKA,
ODPOWIEDZIALNO9t KARNA ZA BLAD W SZTUCE LEKARSKIEJ, 24 (1998); Zdzislaw Marek, BLAD
MEDYCZNY. ODPOWIEDZlALNOti ETYCZNO-DEONTOLOGICZNA I PRAWNA LEKARZA, 35 (2007).
106. OSN 1957/1, item 7.
107. For example, in the judgment of 17 February 1967 (1 CR 435/66), OSN 1967, item 177, the
Supreme Court ruled that an infringement of the duty to apply rules of asepsis during surgery could not
be considered an error because observing such rules constituted an essential obligation of all members
of the hospital's staff and had not required special medical knowledge.
108. This distinction was made before the Civil Code came into force (in the mid 1950's) when
case law admitted that a hospital could be vicariously liable for a doctor only when the latter had com-
mitted an error, while liability for negligence of another kind might be attributed only to an individual
doctor. See Bqczyk-Rozwadowska, supra note 5 at 55.
109. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 79-80.
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manifesting symptoms of a certain disease, is mistakenly diagnosed with an
illness and the following treatment is not detrimental to that patient (the
judgment of the Supreme Court of December 8, 1970; II CR 543/70110). A
similar ruling could be passed if, for example, an injury occurred as a result
of anatomical abnormalities which could not be predicted before an opera-
tion and also in the case when the current state of medical knowledge made
it impossible for the doctor to diagnose a rare illness, as yet not described
in the literature.
4. In the case when certain medical misconduct is subject to both civil
and criminal proceedings, there is no duty to establish negligence twice.
Pursuant to Article 11 of the Code of Civil Proceedings of November
17,1964,111 if a doctor was convicted of a criminal offense, factual findings
conceming his faulty conduct which served as grounds for the final sen-
tence of the penal court are binding for a civil court in the following civil
proceedings.11 2 Therefore, if negligence (as a fault which justifies the tort-
feasor's criminal liability) has already been established by the criminal
court, the civil court takes for granted the fact that a tort (delict) has been
committed and, consequently, establishes only the existence of a causal
link (probability) and the damage and also ascertains the scope of compen-
sation. In the criminal case of August 19, 1953 (IK 295/53)113 adjudicated
in the last instance by the Supreme Court, the lower courts established fault
of an obstetrician who had left the hospital during his working hours while
his patient was going through a complicated childbirth. Lack of proper,
highly qualified medical care and continued supervision had resulted in a
rupture of the uterus, excessive bleeding, and the patient's death, for which
the doctor was found criminally liable. Omission as such constitutes a de-
lict of civil law and could serve as grounds for a compensation claim (of
the family members of the deceased, pursuant to Article 446 of the Civil
Code).
However, if the criminal proceedings have not been finished yet, but
the ascertainments that have already been made may influence the settle-
110. OSN 1970, item 137.
111. Law of 17 November 1964, (Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1964, No. 43, item 296 (Pol.)
- as amended.
112. Criminal liability of doctors (and other members of medical staff) is governed by the general
provisions of the Penal Code (Law of 6 June 1997; Journal of Laws 1997, No. 88, item 553 - as
amended), concerning unintentional crimes and offenses against life and health (Chapter XIX of the
Penal Code). There is no special model of "medical liability," except in Article 192, which penalizes
performing treatment without the patient's consent; Articles 150 and 151, concerning euthanasia;
Articles 152-153, involving voluntary and involuntary abortion; and Article 157a, which concerns
prenatal injuries. See M. Filar, LEKARSKIE PRAWO KARNE 84 (2000).
113. PA1TSTWOIPRAWO381 (1954/2).
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ment of a civil case, the civil court can (and, in practice, usually does) sus-
pend the proceedings until the final judgment of the criminal case. The
same situation occurs when criminal proceedings have not been started yet.
114
It is also worth mentioning that when a criminal action fails (e.g., the
proceedings are discontinued due to the death of the perpetrator), civil liti-
gation is still able to proceed and, as case law proves, may influence the
burden of proof that a plaintiff is obliged to carry. In the judgment of the
Supreme Court of 23 July 2004 (III CK 0071/03)115 the fact that a doctor
had been found guilty of the criminal offense of exposing a patient to the
direct danger of losing his life or suffering from a significant bodily im-
pairment (Article 160 § 2 and § 3 of the Penal Code) served as grounds for
determining causality in a civil litigation suit. In particular, it is possible to
presume the existence of a causal link between the perpetrator's faulty
conduct and the damage (pursuant to Article 231 of the Civil Code) even if
a criminal court has not in casu established causality in a way that is re-
quired by Article 361 § 1 of the Civil Code (and - as such - is binding for
the civil court by virtue of Article 11 of the Code of Civil Proceedings). 116
III. BURDEN OF PROOF AND CAUSATION
1. The general rule is that a patient is burdened with proving damages,
fault and a causal connection between the faulty conduct and damages (Ar-
ticle 6 of the Civil Code). However, in the field of medical malpractice,
these strict requirements have been lowered by case law in order to be more
convenient for a claimant. Otherwise it would be too difficult (if not im-
possible) to establish negligence and to explain whether the damage re-
114. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 November 1961 (II CR 1043/60), OSN 1963/2,
item 35.; see M. Jqdrzejewska, K. Weitz, KODEKS POSTIkPOWANIA CYWILNEGO. CZISC PIERWSZA.
POSTIIPOWANIE ROZPOZNAWCZE, T. 1, 118-119 (T. Erecifiski, ed., 2009).
115. Unreported. In this case a patient died one day after he had left hospital. The reason of his
sudden death was a rupture of an abdominal aortic aneurysm which was not diagnosed properly by a
rentgenologist (error in diagnosis) and, consequently, not treated at all by a cardiologist (therapeutical
error).
116. In the discussed case the rentgenologist was found guilty of causing a direct threat to the
patient's life (which is only a formal offense that does not require the result of faulty conduct of an
accused) but not for the death itself. However, the mere fact of conviction allowed the civil court to
assume that there had been a causal link between the rentgenologist's faulty conduct (error in diagnosis)
and the death, and, consequently, that the death of the patient had caused a significant worsening of the
living standards of the closest members of the family members of the deceased (secondary victims
entitled to compensation on the grounds of Article 446 of the Civil Code).
2011] 1239
CHICAGO-KENT LAWREVIEW
sulted from the doctor's wrongdoing or whether the issue was only the
progression of the patient's initial disease.117
1.1. While in the ex contractu regime the defendant's fault (concern-
ing his own act and omissions) is statutorily presumed on the grounds of
Article 471 of the Civil Code,118 no such statutory presumption exists for
tortious liability. However, in the ex delicto regime the doctor's or hospit-
al's fault and/or causation may be established by means of a factual pre-
sumption (indirect evidence). According to Article 231 of the Code of Civil
Proceedings, the court is allowed to determine fault if, after taking into
consideration the findings that were previously made, it is possible to draw
the conclusion that such fault really exists. In other words, fault must be
obvious in view of all circumstances of the case, unless there is evidence to
the contrary. From that point of view, factual presumption serves as prima
facie evidence, quite similar to the res ipsa loquitur ("things speak for
themselves") rule adopted in common law jurisdictions. 119
Prima facie evidence is usually applied by courts in medical malprac-
tice cases concerning a hospital's failure to provide patients with a safe
hospital stay, in particular, the so-called sponge cases and healthcare-
related (nosocomial) infections involving hepatitis B or C, staphylococcus
and the HIV-virus.
As for the first category, the court deems negligence obvious when it
establishes that surgical instruments (probes, needles, forceps, etc.) or piec-
es of any tampons, plugs, or bandages were left in the patient's body during
an operation, irrespective of what object was ignored (forceps, probes, and
needles are treated in the same way as tampons, plugs, or bandages, which
are more likely to be overlooked due to their absorptiveness).
In the case of infections, the provider's fault and/or causation is pre-
sumed on the grounds of the breach of a duty to observe the rules of hy-
giene and asepsis while treating a patient. In the judgment of January 11,
1972 (1 CR 516/71)120 the Supreme Court ruled that if the patient's death
had been preceded by the negligence of doctors and other medical staff
during surgery and the pre-operation period (failure to verify the patient's
blood group, lack of blood supplies for complicated surgery in the abdo-
117. See the judgment of the Appellate Court in Krak6w of 14 October 1992 (I ACr 374/92), OSA
KR 11, item 44; compare the judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 June 2000 (V CKN 34/00), unre-
ported.
118. See Wojtasiewicz, supra note 27, at 136.
119. Compare Marcin Iliwka, Ciqzar dowodu w procesach medycznych - miqdzy domniemaniami
faktycznymi a dowodem prima facie. II. Domniemania faktyczne a dowdd prima facie, ARCHIWUM
MEDYCYNY SADOWEJ i KRYMINOLOGII 4 (2004/1).
120. OSN 1972, item 59.
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minal cavity, lack of sufficient qualifications of an anaesthesiologist, etc.),
the court might deem causal link established on the grounds of factual pre-
sumption, provided that a conclusion could be drawn that the current medi-
cal knowledge exclude such a connection. 121
However, according to latest case law, hospital infections are not
deemed self-evident. It is necessary for a plaintiff to prove the existence of
a certain act which has been inconsistent with the requirements of hygiene
and asepsis.122 It may be, for example, the improper sterilization of medical
instruments (the judgment of the Supreme Court of October 28, 1983, II
CR 358/83)123 and apparatuses (the judgment of the Appellate Court in
Gdafisk of June 26, 1992, I ACr 254/92)124, faulty disinfection or clean-up
of the hospital premises which is a source of dust and dirt in the hospital
ward (the judgment of the Supreme Court of 14 December 1973, II CR
692/73).125
In the judgment of April 28, 1998 (I ACa 308/98)126 the Appellate
Court in Wroclaw established that the defendant's dialysis center had not
taken necessary precautions to minimize the risk of transmitting infections.
In particular, there were no separate rooms and dialysis apparatuses for
patients, who could be infected with hepatitis and HIV or might be carriers
of AIDS and jaundice. Besides, multiple-use equipment had been applied.
The conclusion was that, in such circumstances, not only was fault evident,
but also a causal link between the defendant's negligence and the patient's
damage (infection with AIDS and hepatitis B) could be presumed without
proof. Since the defendant did not succeed in proving to the contrary, the
claimant was granted compensation.127 In the judgment of February 9,
2000 (I ACa 69/00)128 the Appellate Court in Krak6w applied indirect evi-
dence, taking into consideration the fact that the injured person had been
treated in the ward at the time when a significant number of patients (10 %)
were infected with hepatitis B and the defendant's hospital had not under-
taken any measures to isolate them and, consequently, to prevent the spread
121. Compare the judgment of Appellate Court in Krak6w of 14 October 1992 (1 ACr 374/92),
OSA 1992, item 44.
122. See B. Janiszewska Praktyka sqdowa w sprawach cywilnych a zakazenia szpitalne )-czqid I,
PRAWO I MEDYCYNA (2009/2).
123. OSPiKA 1984, item 187.
124. OSP 1993/10, item 195.
125. OSPiKA 1975, item 94.
126. PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 147 (2002/12),cmt. by M. Nesterowicz.
127. An appeal of the defendant (dialysis centre) was dismissed by the Supreme Court (the judg-
ment of 13 June 2000, V CKN 34/00).
128. Wokanda 1998, item 7.
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of the virus. The hospital ward had therefore become a "source of epidem-
ics."
1.2. As for causality, Article 361 § 1 of the Civil Code requires an
adequate causal connection between faulty acts or omissions and the dam-
age.129 The theory of adequate causality assumes that a person liable to pay
compensation bears liability only for normal consequences of his acts or
omissions from which the damage has resulted. Normal effects are those
which generally occur in similar circumstances; it is not important whether
the same result appears every time. 130
However, in medical malpractice cases it is not required for the cau-
sality to be determined "in a certain manner." 31 According to case law and
doctrine, it may be sufficient to establish "probability of a high degree (the
highest possible in casu)" that a doctor's or hospital's faulty conduct
caused the damage in question.132 The dominant opinion is that as far as the
human body is concerned, certainty hardly ever exists, thus the require-
ments to prove it seem neither real nor justified.133 Therefore, the plaintiff
should not be required to prove in what way and at what exact moment he
became infected, since such proof has usually not been possible in practice.
129. This provision is said to be original with respect to other countries, since it states expressis
verbis that adequacy is a criterion of normative evaluation of the results of a certain event (conduct). Z.
Radwahski, SYSTEM PRAWA CYWILNEGO. PRAWO ZOBOWIAZAIS. CZk tC OG6LNA, 255 (3rd. ed., 1981).
Compare Andrzej Koch, ZWIAZEK PRZYCZYNOWY JAKO PODSTAWA ODPOWIEDZIALNOCI W PRAWIE
CYWILNYM 155 (1975).
130. In order to establish adequate causation it is necessary to find out first whether the hypotheti-
cal elimination of a certain act or conduct (event A) would eliminate the existence of the damage (fact
B). If the answer is affirmative, causal connection between the conduct and the damage is deemed
established (A is a conditio sine qua non of B). Second, it should be verified whether event A is a
condition that generally (in view of statistical data, general or specialized knowledge in a certain do-
main) gives rise to the result B. The estimation is made ex post, on the grounds of all the established
facts and ascertainments that were previously made during the proceedings. Id.; see also Bagifiska, Pol.
Civ. C. supra note 22, at 516.
131. M. Nesterowicz, E. Bagifiska, A. den Exter, MEDICAL LAW 50(2007).
132. Compare the judgment of the District Court in Wroclaw of 11 December 1998 (I C 299/97),
cited by M. Nesterowicz, PRAWO MEDYCZNE 307 (7th ed., 2005). Any particular percentage rate is not
required; however, the probability should be of the highest extent possible (as opposed to "absolute"
certainty). In medical malpractice cases, the standard of proof of causal link between the improper
conduct and the damage is then lower in comparison to other areas of civil liability. The courts have not
made any general rules that apply to the estimation of "probability"; they rather decide on a "case by
case" basis and use different terminology, e.g. "probability of high degree" (the aforementioned judg-
ment of the District Court in Wroclaw of 11 December 1998; 1 C 299/97), "sufficient dose of probabili-
ty" (the judgment of the Supreme Court of 17 June 1969, 1 PR 74/67; OSN 1968/2, item 26) or
"prevailing probability" (the judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 July 1967, 11 CR 165/69, OSPiKA
1969/7 - 8, item 155).
133. The judgment of the Appellate Court in Katowice 20 October 2006 (1 ACa 966/06; LEX
269615). In this case compensation was claimed by a patient who had her kidney removed and had been
infected with staphylococcus as a result of negligent post-operation care.
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In the judgment of June 13, 2000 (V CKN 34/00)134 the Supreme
Court ruled that medical knowledge, due to its imperfection, cannot pro-
vide satisfying answers to each question which concerns the human
body. 135 Many factors may have an influence on the existence of damages,
and it is necessary for a court to establish to what extent a doctor's or hos-
pital's fault may be a probable cause of this damage when compared to
other reasons (e.g., independent development of the disease). However, the
evidence that factors other than the doctor's negligence could have resulted
(but did not have to result) in the injury shall not release the doctor or hos-
pital from liability. As doctrine provides, even in the case of either multip-
lication of such reasons or the increased risk of treatment-resulting, for
example, from the patient's health condition-the provider's liability can-
not be excluded if at least one of the factors that caused the patient's injury
was that doctor's or hospital's negligence or any other kind of fault (a lack
of knowledge, imprudence, etc.). 136
Moreover, in medical malpractice cases the burden of causality is, in
practice, not only lowered (by replacing the requirement of "absolute" or
"exclusive" certainty with the premise of probability of a high degree) but
it may be reversed as well, particularly in the area of healthcare-related
infections. The courts, aware of the difficulties a plaintiff has to face to
prove a causal link between faulty conduct and the damage, deem probabil-
ity established on the grounds of factual presumption, according to Article
231 of the Code of Civil Proceedings. In the judgment of January 22, 1998
(II UKN 465/97)137 the Supreme Court ruled that a high degree of probabil-
ity may be also presumed (by means of indirect evidence), provided this
presumption is a logical conclusion derived from properly established facts
that serve as the premise of such a presumption. 138 Thus, in order to be
exempt from liability, the defendant doctor or hospital should rebut the
probability or at least impair it by showing that there had been some other
probable reasons for the patient's injury. 139
134. LEX 52689.
135. Since the court not only lowered the burden of proof but also reversed it, the defendant hospit-
al, in order to be exempt from liability, had to rebut the probability or at least impair it by showing that
there had been some other probable reasons for the patient's injury. Reversal as such has been common
in malpractice cases concerning hospital-acquired infections. See the aforementioned judgment of the
Supreme Court of I1 January 1972 (I CR 516/71).
136. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 96.
137. OSNP 1999/1, item 24.
138. Compare the aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court of 11 January 1972 (1 CR
516/71).
139. Compare the aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 June 2000 (V CKN 34/00)
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In view of case law and doctrine, it is not necessary for a causal con-
nection (probability) between negligent conduct and the injury to be direct
(like in a typical sponge case, where a medical instrument is left in the
patient's body) since indirect intermediate causality may also serve as a
prerequisite of a valid compensation claim (e.g., when the improperly per-
formed operation causes the necessity to operate again and during the next
operation an injury appears).140 In the judgment of November 4, 1960 (II
CR 411/59)141 the Supreme Court assumed that there was a normal causal
connection between a lack of proper supervision on the part of the defen-
dant's hospital and an accident which had occurred when a mentally dis-
turbed patient jumped out of the window. In the Court's opinion, the fact
that the cause of the patient's injury was remote was of no relevance, as
long as the result thereof (severe bodily impairment of a patient) could be
qualified as normal in view of Article 361 § 1 of the Civil Code.
This view has been confirmed in the judgment of the Supreme Court
of June 17, 2009 (IV CSK 37/09).142 The Court ruled that physicians who
neglected to examine a one-year old baby closely enough, which resulted in
the failure to diagnose cerebral palsy and a two-year delay in starting the
necessary treatment, were liable for the further deterioration of the patient's
health even though the doctors' fault was not the direct reason of the injury.
The Court explained that cerebral palsy, which had appeared as a conse-
quence of organic brain damage, was not causally connected with the doc-
tors' negligent omission. However, a failure to make a correct diagnosis
was the indirect reason for diminished (by 20%) chances of the child's
health improvement.
IV. COMPENSATION
1. While on the grounds of contractual provisions it is only possible to
claim compensation for pecuniary lOSS143, the ex delicto regime provides
the injured with a wide scope of compensation for personal injury, includ-
ing pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss for the injured himself (Articles 444-
445 of the Civil Code)144 and, in the case of his death, for secondary vic-
140. Id.
141. OSPiKA 1962/9, item 251.
142. OSP 2010/9, item 93 cmt. by M. Nesterowicz.
143. However, in the view of academic doctrine it seems necessary to make it possible for the
injured to claim compensation for a non-pecuniary loss also in the ex contractu regime. See M. Safjan,
NAPRAWIENIE KRZYWDY NIEMAJATKOWEJ W RAMACH ODPOWIEDZIALN0Cl EX CONTRACTU IN:
ODPOWIEDZIALNOtt CYWILNA. KSIRGA PAMIATKOWA KU CZCI PROFESORA ADAMA SZPUNARA 255
(M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, ed., 2004); M. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 20.
144. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 June 2000 (V CKN 34/00), PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 22
(2005/2).
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tims (immediate members of his family) and for pecuniary loss only for
those whom he had a statutory duty to support or voluntarily and perma-
nently supported (Article 446).145 The Polish Civil Code does not limit the
amount of damages that should be paid for a personal injury. Therefore, a
doctor or a hospital found to be liable has to indemnify the patient for any
and all damage which results from negligent treatment. Any contractual
limitations are deemed invalid (pursuant to Articles 58 and 353' of the Civil
Code).
2. A pecuniary loss has to be compensated in full, according to Article
361 § 2 of the Civil Code (comprising damnum emergens and lucrum ces-
sans). A patient may claim a single-payment indemnity for medical care
costs and loss of income (Article 444 § 1 of the Civil Code) and, when his
disability is permanent, periodical payments in the form of annuity (Article
444 § 2 of the Civil Code).146
Medical care costs are interpreted broadly as all necessary expenses
incurred by the patient as a result of the injury, including consultations with
the best specialists, 147 an expensive treatment abroad,148 and the necessary
medical equipment and drugs which are not covered by the health insur-
ance scheme.149 As case law provides, these are also costs of transport to a
health care facility (for consultations, rehabilitation services, further aux-
iliary tests, etc.); expenses resulting from visits to a hospital paid by rela-
tives; and costs of home medical care and assistance rendered by a nurse,
social worker, etc.150 However, in order to receive compensation, a patient
should prove that the aforementioned costs are justified (in view of medical
knowledge) and necessary to alleviate the personal injury he has sustained.
What is more, the injured is the only person entitled to make a claim even
if medical care costs were in casu bome by third parties (the patient's rela-
145. See Ewa Bagifiska, Roszczenie o zado96uczynienie na podstawie art. 446 § 4 kodeksu
cywilnego na tie dodwiadczei europejskich, KOMPENSACJA SZK6D KOMUNIKACYJNYCH. NOWOCZESNE
ROZWIAZANIA UBEZPIECZENIOWE 138 (K. Ludwichowska, ed., 2011).
146. Section I of Article 444 states: "In the case of bodily injury or damage to health, damages
shall include all costs arising therefrom. Upon the request of the injured person, the person obliged to
redress the damage shall pay the sums required for the costs of medical treatment in advance and, if the
injured person becomes disabled, he shall also pay the sums required to train him for an alternative
occupation in advance." Section 2 states: "If the injured person completely or partially loses his ability
to work or if his needs increase or his future prospects are diminished, he may demand an appropriate
annuity from the person obliged to redress the damage." Bagifiska, Pol. Civ. C. supra note 22, art. 444.
147. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 June 1969 (II PR 217/69), OSN 1970/3, item 50;
the judgment of the Appellate Court in Katowice of 26 November 1991 r. (III APr 75/91), OSA 1992/6,
item 38.
148. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 December 2007 (1 CSK 384/07), unreported.
149. The judgment of the District Court in Katowice of 12 December 2003 (11 C 911/01/05),
PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 122 (2005/12).
150. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 21 March 1973, OSPiKA 1974, item 183.
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tives, members of his close or closest family, statutory or factual guardians,
etc.).151
Upon the demand of the patient, the doctor or health care institution
liable for the damage should, in advance, deposit the sum needed to cover
the costs of treatment. In the judgment of the Supreme Court of December
13, 2007 (I CSK 384/07)152 the Court ruled that the right to claim an ad-
vance payment arose irrespective of whether the injured person was en-
titled to medical services within the scope of the health insurance scheme
and whether he was at all able to incur these costs by himself, at least par-
tially. In the court's opinion, the only condition to make such a claim is to
present evidence that a certain kind of treatment (or medical services),
qualified as a sub-standard procedure not covered by the NFZ insurance, is
in casu necessary and justified in view of current medical knowledge.
Therefore, a health care provider cannot be obliged to make an advance
payment when it has been proved that all the costs of medical care are in-
curred by the National Health Fund or the Ministry of Health (if highly
qualified procedures financed by the State are concernedl 53).
As for annuity, an original solution of Polish law is that it may be
awarded in three circumstances: when the victim has completely or partial-
ly lost his ability to work, when his needs have increased, and when his
future prospects have been diminished.154 Any of these conditions, whether
alone or concurrent with the others, entitles the injured to make a claim.
Claims for annuity are relatively frequent in medical malpractice cas-
es, due to the unique nature of personal injury. In the case of December 12,
2003 (II C 911/01/05)155 the Appellate Court in Wroclaw granted an annui-
ty for the increased needs (PLN 700 per month; 175 C) of a patient who had
suffered serious injuries as a consequence of the unnecessary removal of
the lower part of his large intestine and pelvirectal sphincter (fistula).
While estimating the amount of damages, the court took into consideration
the costs of purchasing necessary somatic and anti-depressive drugs; ex-
penses for periodical consultations with psychiatrists and psychologists
(due to his breakdown and depression); costs for a special low-fiber diet
151. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 4 July 1969 (I CR 116/69), OSN 1970, item 82.
152. Unreported. This case concerned a minor who had suffered serious injury (right hand paresis)
as a result of a negligently performed delivery. He proved that an advance payment was necessary to
cover the costs of an expensive operation in Texas (USA) as well as all the expenses for transport and
accommodation. The court found the claim justified. Compare the aforementioned judgment of 26 June
1969 (11 PR 217/69).
153. See the aforementioned Ordinance of Ministry of Health of 13 December 2004 (concerning
highly specialized medical procedures financed by the State).
154. See Judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 June 2000 (V CKN 34/00).
155. PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 122 (2005/2).
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and vitamins; and the costs of additional clothes, bed clothes, and sanitary
equipment not refunded within the NFZ insurance.
As case law provides, the increased needs usually serve as grounds for
an annuity claimed by minors. In the aforementioned judgment of June 17,
2009 (IV CSK 37/09)156 the Supreme Court ruled that if due to the doctor's
negligence (an omission to diagnose cerebral palsy early enough to start
proper treatment in time), the patient had lost his chances for health im-
provement, the main goal of the annuity for increased needs was to redress
a pecuniary loss which involved higher, continuous expenses (for rehabili-
tation, physiotherapy, professional indoor care, consultations with special-
ists, etc.) that would be incurred in the future for a defined or undefined
period of time.
When the damage is evident but there are some difficulties with esti-
mating its scope (because rehabilitation is still in progress or the treatment
has not been completed) the court may grant, at its discretion, an amount of
money which it deems appropriate in view of all circumstances of the rele-
vant case (pursuant to Article 322 of the Code of Civil Proceedings). De-
tailed and precise findings that prove the extent of pecuniary loss are then
not always necessary, which makes this legal solution advantageous for
claimants. Therefore, Article 322 of the Code of Civil Proceedings is ap-
plied in a significant number of malpractice cases, in particular those that
concern annuity. 157
Furthermore, if the injured is granted either a single-payment indemni-
ty or an annuity (or both), the defendant may be liable for further loss that
may appear in the future as a result of the same event. This legal principle
adopted by case law is to prevent a possible a future claim from falling
under what is known in common law countries as the statute of limita-
tions. 15 8
According to the prevailing view of case law and doctrine, accident
insurance benefits received by the injured from social security insurance
are deducted from the amount of compensation awarded by the civil court
on the grounds of Article 444 of the Civil Code (compensatio lucri cum
damno).159 However, no deduction can be made in the case where a patient
156. OSP 2010/9, item 93.
157. The judgment of Supreme Court of 25 November 1999 (II CKN 476/88), Nesterowicz, supra
note 10, at 100-101.
158. See, e.g., the judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 April 1970 (III PZP 34/69), OSN 1970,
item 217.
159. A. Smieja, PRAWO ZOBOW1AZAN-CZWt OGOLNA. TOM 6 680 (A. Olejniczak, ed., 2009); A.




(or a person acting on his behalf) voluntarily concluded an accident insur-
ance contract (known in Polish as NW) with a commercial insurer (Article
829 of the Civil Code). The opinion is that a person who takes care of his
interests and pays premiums to have better protection against certain risks
or events should not be treated in the same way as the injured who was not
so provident (the rule of compensation lucri cum damno is then not ap-
plied).160
3. Unlike the situation concerning material damages, compensation for
a non-pecuniary loss is at the court's discretion. Therefore, even in the case
where all necessary premises of the defendant's liability have been met, it
is up to the court to decide whether a patient should be indemnified for pain
and suffering. If a claim is deemed justified, the court may grant an amount
which is appropriate to the damages in question.161 A reimbursement is
made exclusively in the form of a single-payment, pursuant to Article 445
of the Civil Code.162
There are no statutory rules concerning the assessment of damages for
pain and suffering; thus, in this area, the courts make decisions on a case-
by-case basis, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances and re-
ferring to the directives offered by case law and doctrine. According to
these directives, the scope of compensation should depend, first of all, on
the extent of the non-pecuniary loss (the degree of pain and suffering).163
Further relevant criteria are the severity of physical and moral conse-
quences of the injury, the victim's age, degree of the tortfeasor's fault,
duration of the disease, patient's prospects for future personal and profes-
sional life, and the possibility of further health deterioration.164
160. Id; see also the judgment of Supreme Court (PSiAPiUS) of 23-24 April 1965 (III PO 3/65);
OSN 1965/12, item 198.
161. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 15 September 1999 (III CKN 339/98), OSP 2000/4,
item 66. As case law provides, a claim for moral damages can be dismissed only when the degree of
pain and suffering is minor (the judgment of the Supreme Court of 23 January 1974, OSPiKA 1975,
item 171). Furthermore, each decision of the court, whether awarding or refusing moral damages,
should be based on objective criteria and well-grounded in the motives of the judgment. A Szpunar op.
cit., 79.
162. Section I of Article 445 states: "In the cases specified in [Article 444], the court may award to
the injured person an appropriate sum as compensation for non-pecuniary harm." Ewa Baginska,
Roszczenie o zadoiuczynienie na podstawie art. 446 § 4 kodeksu cywilnego na Ie dodwiadczeri
europejskich,KOMPENSACJA SZKOD KOMUNIKACYJNYCH. NOWOCZESNE ROZWIAZANIA
UBEZPIECZENIOWE 138 (K. Ludwichowska, ed., 2011).
163. The resolution of the Supreme Court of 8 December 1973 (III CZP 33/73), OSN 1974/9, item
45.
164. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 104; M. Walachowska, ZADOSUCZYNIENIE ZA SZKODk
NIEMAJATKOWA 127 (2007).
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In the judgment of the District Court in Bydgoszcz of July 19, 1999 (I
C 1150/98)165 the court granted moral damages to a woman who, after
being misdiagnosed with breast cancer, had undergone a medically unjusti-
fied removal of both breasts. While estimating the scope of damages, the
court took into consideration the age of the patient (twenty-four), the lack
of medical grounds for surgical procedures, the irreversibility of the injury,
the emotional shock, mental distress, necessity to be treated by psychiatr-
ists and neurologists (due to severe depression), as well as further conse-
quences of the disfigurement of the body for the patient's private life: the
inability to work for a long time, isolation, divorce, etc.
The behavior of a person liable for the redress of damage may also in-
fluence the extent of compensation for a non-pecuniary loss. In the judg-
ment of January 9, 1978 (IV CR 510/77)166 the Supreme Court admitted
that it might be possible to increase the scope of the indemnity when a
health care institution did not take any measures to provide the injured (a
woman who suffered a serious bodily impairment during delivery) with the
appropriate advice and assistance. In the Court's opinion, such an attitude
of the defendant's hospital to the injured person added to the damage (pain
and suffering of the patient), so granting a higher amount of compensation
seemed justified.
In addition, the transitory nature of pain and suffering does not make it
impossible for a patient to claim compensation for a non-pecuniary loss. In
the judgment of March 20, 2002 (V CKN 909/00)167 the Supreme Court
ruled that the mere fact that moral damage had not existed at the time of the
judgment did not exclude a successful compensation claim. In addition, a
reimbursement may be claimed by a person who is not aware or does not
seem to be aware of the moral harm because of his mental disturbance or
age.
Both Polish case law and doctrine are not likely to apply percentage
schemes and average remuneration rates for the degrees of permanent bodi-
ly injury. In the judgment of the Appellate Court in Krak6w of February
18, 1998 (I ACa 715/97)168 the court held that such "guidelines" might be
165. OSP 2002/4, item 59 cmt. by M. Nesterowicz. Compare other cases concerning unnecessary
treatment or operation-the judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 February 2005 (V KK 375/04),
PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 125 (2006/1), cmt. by J. Wyrembak; the judgment of 4 July 1969 (1 PR 178/69),
OSN 1970/4, item 71.
166. OSN 1978/11, item 210. This case concerned a woman who had suffered rupture of the pubic
symphysis during delivery. After the injury had appeared, she was not offered any support by the
hospital; in particular, she was given no psychological assistance and no directions concerning further
medical treatment.
167. PRZEGLAD SADOWY 141 (2003/4) cmt. by K. Bqczyk.
168. OSA 1999/2, item 7.
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helpful to settle claims for moral damages but, as not very comprehensive,
they could not be decisive. In particular, a comparison between an amount
of compensation for non-pecuniary loss and an average remuneration rate
may not be made automatically without taking into consideration all rele-
vant circumstances of the case in question, such as the direct results of the
damaging act (any bodily impairment, or mental disturbance), further dete-
rioration of the patient's health, the emotional attitude to the sustained
damage, and any permanent results thereof. The court made this distinction
because compensation for a non-pecuniary loss is given as a special kind of
damage which is usually not easy to estimate (the judgment of the Appel-
late Court in Bialystok of 9 April 1991, I ACr 53/91)169.
Recent case law suggests that damages for a non-pecuniary loss serve
the purpose of compensation. The principle of a moderate award for pain
and suffering, which required the compensation to correspond with the
standard conditions of living of an average member of society, 170 has for-
tunately lost its importance and is applied as a subsidiary criterion or it is
not taken into consideration at all. In the precedent-setting judgment of
March 10, 2006 (IV CSK 80/85)171 the Supreme Court ruled that the main
factor which should be taken into account while estimating the quantum of
damages was the degree of pain and suffering. The principle of moderate
compensation might be then applied as a supplementary one, provided its
application does not interfere with the compensatory function of moral
damages.
Since the courts follow this new direction, the amounts of moral dam-
ages have become slightly higher lately. For example, in 2006 minors who
had suffered cerebral palsy as a result of negligent treatment during their
delivery were awarded around PLN 300,000 (75,000 E)172, and in late 2009
and 2010 the courts used to grant not less than PLN 500,000 (128,205 E) to
compensate this kind of injury.173 However, in 2011 as much as PLN
169. OSA 1992, item 50; see also the judgment of the Supreme Court of 28 VI 2005 (I CK 7/05),
LEX 153254.
170. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 June 1965 (I PR 203/65), OSPiKA 1996/4, item 92.
171. OSP 2007/1, item II cmt. by M. Nesterowicz. In this case a twelve-year-old girl was negli-
gently diagnosed with kidney cancer. She underwent chemotherapy and one of her kidneys was imme-
diately removed. The actual disease was very rare but could have been diagnosed if further examination
(biopsy) had been ordered.
172. See the judgment of the Appellate Court in Poznafi of 8 February 2006 (I ACa 1131/05),
unreported.
173. According to statistical data, cases concerning injuries sustained in connection with delivery
give rise to 37% of all malpractice suits. Adam Makosz, supra note 56.
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900,000 (225,000 E) was awarded for that specific kind of injury.174 As for
hospital infections, while in the late 1990s compensation for infection with
hepatitis B amounted to PLN 5,000 (1,300 E) for adult patients and as much
as PLN 8,000 (2,000 E) for minors; and PLN 20,000 to 50,000 (5,130 E to
12,820 C) for hepatitis C. Accordingly, in 2000 to 2010 these amounts were
doubled or even tripled (e.g., in 2010 the average compensation for a non-
pecuniary loss resulting from hepatitis C amounted to PLN 375,000, which
is equivalent to 93,750 E).
While a claim for redressing material damages devolves upon the
heirs (according to the general rules of succession law), a claim for com-
pensation for a non-pecuniary loss, due to its personal nature, expires with
the death of the injured. However, this rule is not applied when a person
responsible for the redress of damage has acknowledged the claim in writ-
ing or when a suit was filed before the death of the injured (Article 445 § 3
of the Civil Code).175 The inherited claim should then be accepted by the
adjudicating court in the same amount as it would have been the injured
person's at the time of his death. The fact that the heirs have their own
claims resulting from the death of the patient (as secondary victims, on the
grounds of Article 446 of the Civil Code) is of no importance and may not
influence any court's decision. 176
4.If a patient dies as a result of medical malpractice, indemnity may
be sought by secondary victims on the grounds of Article 446 of the Civil
Code. As it was already mentioned, they can pursue up to two claims for
pecuniary loss as well as a claim for a non-pecuniary loss. The kind of
claim and, consequently, the scope of compensation depends on the cir-
cumstances of the case, in particular the nature and intensity of the relation-
ship between the claimant and the deceased.
First, the persons with respect to whom the deceased had a statutory
duty of maintenance (according to the provisions of the Family and Guar-
dianship Code' 77) may claim the so-called compulsory pension from the
doctor or hospital obliged to redress the damage, irrespective of whether
the injured himself had de facto fulfilled this duty before he died (Article
446 § 2 Sentence 1 of the Civil Code). This group of secondary victims
174. The judgment of the Appellate Court in Krak6w of 2 March 2011. Apart from moral damages,
the court granted an annuity of PLN 4,800 (1,200 C) and a single-payment indemnity for medical care
costs amounting to PLN 9,500 (2,375 E), GAZETA PRAWNA (3 March 2011).
175. Compare the judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 March 1975 (II CR 53/75), LEX 7682.
176. Gerard Bieniek, KOMENTARZ DO KODEKSU CYWILNEGO. KSIkGA TRZECIA. ZOBOWIAZANIA.
TOM I 611 ( G. Bieniek, ed., 2008).
177. The Law of 25 February 1964, Journal of Laws 1964, No. 43, item 296 - as amended.
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comprises descendants and ascendants of the patient, his brothers and sis-
ters, spouse, adopted parent and adoptee as well as other kin.
Other persons related to the deceased can be awarded the so-called fa-
cultative pension if the patient, before his death, voluntarily and perma-
nently (but without a legal obligation) supplied them with means of
maintenance. However, the rule is that a court grants such a pension at its
discretion, after having established that the claim is justified in view of the
principle of rightness (boni mores) and equity (pursuant to Article 446 § 2
Sentence 2 of the Civil Code). It is then necessary to consider all circums-
tances of the case, in particular the personal and economic situation of the
claimant after the death of his maintenance supplier (breadwinner). The
Civil Code offers no definition of "other persons closely related to the de-
ceased," but according to case law and doctrine this group comprises
brothers and sisters of the deceased, his parents and children, as well as a
person in a quasi-marital relationship (a partner), and certain other persons.
There is a rule that defacto relations, not family ties, should be decisive to
deem a person "closely related" in terms of Article 446 § 2 of the Civil
Code. 178
Both obligatory and facultative pensions should be calculated in ac-
cordance with the needs of the claimant as well as the financial possibilities
and potential earning circumstances of the deceased. The health care pro-
vider liable for the damage is obliged to pay the annuity for the period of
the likely duration of the maintenance duty.179 According to doctrine and
case law, there is no possibility to award one joint pension for all secondary
victims who are entitled to it. A claim for annuity is personal by nature, and
the court should decide about each claimant separately, considering all
relevant circumstances of the case.' 80
Second, the closest members of the family of the deceased may claim
an appropriate single-payment indemnity, pursuant to Article 446 § 3 of the
Civil Code, if the death of the injured resulted in a considerable deteriora-
tion of the former's living standards.
The Civil Code neither gives a definition of the closest family mem-
bers nor explains who may belong to this group. According to case law and
doctrine, this category comprises of parents and children of the deceased
and other persons related to them, such as close and remote ascendants and
178. Z. Radwafiski, A. OLEJNICZAK ZOBOW1AZANIA-CZSC OGOLNA. ZARYS WYKLADU, 257
(2009).
179. A. Cisek, KODEKS CYWILNY. KOMENTARZ 801( E. Gniewek, ed., 3rd ed. 2008)
180. Id.
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descendants as well as in-laws.181 The Supreme Court found that a person
entitled to a single-payment indemnity may also be an aunt or an uncle 82
who had been keeping the household for the deceased, an illegitimate child
brought up by grandparents as a foster child,'83 and a step-mother who had
taken care of her step-son since the earliest days of his life.184 The domi-
nant view is that the notion of family should be interpreted broadly as de-
scribing not only legal but also actual relations between persons living in
the same household, provided this relation is serious, constant, and stable
(family sensu largo).)8 5
As case law provides, a single-payment indemnity aims at rewarding
that kind of pecuniary loss which has not been covered (or may not be cov-
ered) by an annuity awarded on the grounds of Article 446 § 2 of the Civil
Code. These are, in particular, broadly interpreted material damages (a
pecuniary loss) that are difficult to evaluate, like the worsening of the eco-
nomic situation of the claimant, loss of possibility of either improving his
living conditions in the future or fulfilling the intended life goals (if e.g.,
after the death of a family breadwinner an adolescent child has to give up
his studies in order to start working gainfully to support his family or help
them with the household). 86 The rule is that a court should apply only
objective criteria to verify whether such a pecuniary loss exists and whether
it results from the death of the closest family member. The mere subjective
feeling that the claimant's living standards have deteriorated may not merit
compensation.187
181, A. Szpunar, WYNAGRODZENIE SZKODY WYNIKLEJ WSKUTEK MIERCI OSOBY BLISKIEJ
156(2003); Kinga Bkczyk-Rozwadowska, Roszczenia odszkodowawcze rodzin poszkodowanych
pacjent6wpo nowelizacji kodeksu cywilnego (art. 446 § 4 k.c.), PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 32-33 (2010/2).
182. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 31 May 1938; Zbi6r Orzecznictwa SN 1939, item 100.
183. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 August 1970 (11 CR 313/70), OSN 1971/3, item 56.
184. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 December 1969 (III PRN 77/69), OSN 1970/9, item
160. There is a question whether a person in a quasi-marital relationship and, in particular, a partner of
the same sex may be qualified as the closest member of family within the meaning of art. 446 § 3 of the
Civil Code. See Bqczyk-Rozwadowskasupra note 181, at 33; A. Daszewski, Od stosownego
odszkodowania do zadoiduczynienia pieniqznego za krzywdq dla najblizszych czlonkdw rodziny
zmarlego, PRAWO ASEKURACYJNE 20 (2008/4).
185. Bqczyk-Rozwadowska, supra note 181, at 33.
186. Before the Civil Code was amended with Article 446 § 4 (discussed below), an indemnity for
the deterioration of living standards used to cover also some elements of a non-pecuniary loss. In
particular, the courts assumed that the death of a little child resulted in a deterioration of the living
standards of his parents not only when it caused actual material loss. The parents' pain and suffering
also impaired their everyday activity and, consequently, affected the possibility of improving their
living conditions in the future. See Radwafiski, supra note 178, at 258; the judgment of the Supreme
Court of 13 May 1969 (11 CR 128/69), OSPiKA 1070/6, item 122; the judgment of the Supreme Court
15 October 2002 (It CKN 985/00), unreported.
187. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 4 November 1980 (IV CR 412/80), unreported.
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The indemnity for the deterioration of living standards can be sought
by secondary victims, irrespective of any other claims these persons are
entitled to make, in particular on the grounds of Article 446 § 2 and § 4 of
the Civil Code. However, it is up to the court to decide whether the persons
in question should in casu be awarded and in what amount.
Third, the new provision of Article 446 § 4 of the Civil Code (in force
since August 3, 2009) entitles the closest members of family to claim com-
pensation for pain and suffering resulting from the death of the injured.
Each member of the family is allowed to pursue this claim separately, in-
dependently of the others and irrespective of whether he has been granted
an annuity or single-payment indemnity for a considerable worsening of
their living standards. 188
Moral damage suffered by secondary victims is mostly of a psychical
nature since it involves all negative feelings and experiences of the closest
family member after the death of the injured person. As doctrine provides,
it may be psychical pain, emotional shock or breakdown, feelings of sad-
ness, hopelessness and loneliness, as well as a loss of meaning of continued
existence. 189 In light of this view, moral damage sustained by the closest
members of family can also involve helplessness, perplexity, loss of sup-
port and assistance in household activities, feeling of lost hope, and loss of
motivation to overcome the hardships of everyday life. 190 However, it is
not necessary to prove that a plaintiff has suffered a certain type of illness
or mental disease (e.g., neurosis, depression or another kind of mental dis-
turbance) that has been confirmed by a doctor in a respective field of medi-
cine. Determining the existence and scope of such damage requires taking
into consideration all relevant circumstances of the case and making a tho-
rough analysis of the individual situation of the claimant. Since the latter
may (and usually will) be subjective and likely to overestimate his non-
pecuniary loss, the court should establish that the pain and suffering are
real and of the kind that would render compensation justified.191
Since Article 446 § 4 of the Civil Code is a new regulation, there aris-
es a question about establishing adequate causality between the death of the
injured and the moral damage suffered by the closest member of the family
in question. Both life experience and medical science acknowledge that the
death of the closest relative usually results in serious moral harm: emotion-
188. Kinga B4czyk-Rozwadowska, Roszczenia odszkodowawcze rodzin poszkodowanych
pacjenl6wpo nowelizacji kodeksu cywilnego (art. 446 § 4 k.c.), PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 28 (2010/2).
189. Id. Compare M. Walachowska, Wynagrodzenie szkdd poniesionych na skutek doznania
wstrzqsupsychicznego spowodowanego imierciq osoby bliskiej, PRZEGLAD SADowY 46 (2004/7-8).
190. See the judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 July 2000 (Ill CKN 842/98), LEX 513/57.
191. B4czyk-Rozwadowska, supra note 181, at 29.
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al distress and breakdown, which may also manifest itself in a form of cer-
tain mental diseases. It is then probable that the courts will find probability
of high degree sufficient to justify a claim for compensation based on Ar-
ticle 446 § 4 of the Civil Code or will require only a conditio sine qua non
to be established with certainty. The necessity of providing secondary vic-
tims with a sufficient legal protection as far as compensation is concerned
may also make the courts assume the existence of pain and suffering with-
out any proof, only on the grounds of the close relation between the clai-
mant and deceased (especially in the case of spouses and parents-children
relationships).
All of aforementioned claims based on Article 446 of the Civil Code
are secondary victims' own claims. They may be pursued irrespective of
whether a certain family member is an heir of the deceased (in view of
provisions of succession law) or not. These claims are also independent of
the claims of the injured person himself and from the remuneration that he
had been awarded before he died.192
5. Moral damages are not limited to situations where, as a result of
medical malpractice, a patient suffers a personal injury within the meaning
of Articles 444 and 445 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to Article 4 Section
1193 of the new Law on Patients' Rights and Patients' Ombudsman of No-
vember 6, 2008194, it is possible to claim compensation for a non-pecuniary
loss when a patient's rights have been infringed even if the patient has not
sustained any bodily impairment or health disturbance at the same time.
The object of protection under the Law on Patients' Rights is not human
life and health as such but a special category of non-material interests of a
patient: his privacy, dignity, personal autonomy, and freedom to decide
about the integrity of the body.195 However, Article 4 requires an infringe-
ment of the patient's rights to be faulty and causally connected with acts or
omissions of a doctor or a hospital.196 If these premises are fulfilled, the
court may, at its discretion, award moral damages on the grounds of Article
448 of the Civil Code.197 It is not important whether the liability of a doctor
192. Id.
193. Section I of Article 4 states: "A person harmed by a negligent breach of his rights as a patient
may claim pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary harm in an action based on Article 448 of the
Civil Code", Bagitiska, Pol. Civ. C. supra note 22, art. 4.
194. Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2008, No. 52, item 417 (Pol.) - as amended.
195. See the judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 May 2007 (V CSK 76/07), OSN 2008/7-8, item
9 cmt., M. Walachowska.
196. M. Nesterowicz, Zadoiduczynienie pieniqine za doznanq krzywdq w ,,procesach lekarskich",
PANlSTWO I PRAWO 17 ( 2005/5).
197. Article 448 states: "In the case of an infringement of personal interests, the court may, inde-
pendently of other measures necessary to remove the results of the infringement, award the injured
person an appropriate sum as compensation for non-pecuniary harm or may, at his request, award an
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or a hospital is in casu tortious (pursuant to Article 415 or 430 of the Civil
Code) or contractual (pursuant to Article 471 or 474 of the Civil Code),
since Article 4 concerns all health care providers, irrespective of their sta-
tus (public or private) and the form in which they render medical servic-
es. 198
As case law provides, compensation for a non-pecuniary loss may be
granted, in particular, for performing treatment without the patient's valid
consent, even if the medical procedures were carried out properly (lege
artis) and resulted in the improvement of his health.199 However, if a doc-
tor's conduct performed without the patient's consent has caused a bodily
impairment or a health disturbance, the injured person can either claim
compensation for pain and suffering on the grounds of Article 445 of the
Civil Code or he may pursue his claims for moral damages using Article 4
(in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code), indicating the mere
infringement of his right to decide about the integrity of his body. Thus, in
view of case law and doctrine, the relation between Article 445 of the Civil
Code and Article 4 is deemed an alternative concurrence of liability provi-
sions. 200
Furthermore, the patient is allowed to seek indemnity for being treated
without his consent if a certain kind of treatment was necessary to save his
life or prevent him from serious disability. This view was confirmed by the
Supreme Court before the enactment of the Law on Patients' Rights, in the
judgment of October 14, 2005 r. (III CK 99/05).201 In this case, a claimant
was diagnosed with kidney cancer, and the only possible method to treat
and save her life was a resection of that kidney. The operation was per-
formed lege artis, but without the patient's consent; the doctors presumed
that the consent had existed, taking into consideration the necessity of the
treatment and the fact that the patient, aware of the danger, would have
certainly agreed. The Supreme Court ruled that a claim for moral damages
could be justified also in the case where a certain medical treatment or an
operation had been carried out without the patient's consent. 202 In another
appropriate sum to a social cause chosen by him. Art. 445 § 3 shall apply." Bagifiska, Pol. Civ. C.,
supra note 22, art. 448.
198. M. Walachowska, USTAWA 0 PRAWACH PACJENTA I RZECZNIKU PRAW PACJENTA. Komentarz
11 (M. Nesterowicz, ed., 2009); Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 17.
199. The judgment of the Appellate Court in Warszawa of 31 March 2006 (1 ACa 973/05), LEX
252827.
200. Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 32.
201. OSN 2006/7-8, item 137 cmt. by M. 9widerska, K. Bqczyk-Rozwadowska and B.
Janiszewska.
202. Compare the judgment of the Supreme Court of 14 November 1972 r. (I CR 463/72), NOWE
PRAWO 1975/4, 585 cmt. by M. Nesterowicz.
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precedent-setting judgment of October 27, 2005 (III CK 185/05)203 the
Supreme Court ruled that a statement (declaration) in which Jehova's wit-
ness objected to any kind of blood transfusion was binding on a doctor (or
hospital), provided that the patient's will had been expressed consciously
and clearly enough to eliminate any doubts about the patient's intentions.
In the court's opinion, since the law protects the patient's autonomy and
freedom to decide about the integrity of the body, irrespective of the mo-
tives for refusing treatment, a lack of patient consent to medical procedures
of a certain kind is always binding on the doctor. Consequently, treatment
or surgery carried out against the patient's will always renders the doctor's
conduct unlawful and justify the patient's claim for compensation.
According to doctrine, the mere knowledge about the necessity of
treatment and the dangers connected with the omission to take certain pre-
cautions does not exclude the duty of the doctor (hospital) to respect the
autonomy of the patient and his freedom to decide about the integrity of the
body.204 Furthermore, the above mentioned circumstances may not justify
any medical procedure carried out without the patient's consent, since such
conduct remains illegal as long as the patient has no desire to be treated.
However, two questions arise: whether in similar cases moral damages
should be awarded in lower amounts and whether a claim for compensation
could be found by the court to be contrary to the principles of rightness
(boni mores) and equity and, as such, not taken into consideration at all.205
6.Compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss may also
be claimed in criminal proceedings. 206 The injured, as a civil law claimant
(and in case of his death, secondary victims-persons closest to the in-
jured207), is allowed to attach a so-called adhesion claim (pow6dztwo adhe-
zyine) to the criminal prosecution on the grounds of Article 62 of the Code
of Criminal Proceedings (adhaeret causae criminali).208 However, the
203. Biuletyn SN 2006/2, item 9.
204. See M. Swiderska, ZGODA PACJENTA NA ZABIEG MEDYCZNY 15 (2006).
205. Compare Walachowska, supra note 198, at 26 and Nesterowicz, supra note 10, at 138.
206. The proceedings consist then of two parts. One of them is a criminal action that aims at attri-
buting criminal guilt to the perpetrator and convicting him. The second part is a civil litigation which
goal is to reimburse the loss sustained as a result of a criminal delict. See P. Mierzejewski,
KOMPENDIUM PRAWA KARNEGO 205 (2010).
207. According to Article 115 § II of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, a person closest to the
injured is his spouse, ascendant or descendent, siblings, a person related by affinity (an akin of the same
line or degree), adopter or adoptee and a person in a quasi-marriage relationship. See CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS art. 115 (Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1997, No. 89, item 555 (Pol.) - as
amended).
208. Law of 6 June 1997, Journal of Laws 1997, No. 89, item 55. Article 62 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Proceedings states: "Until the judicial proceeding in the main trial are commenced, the injured
person may bring a civil action (adhesion claim) against the perpetrator to have his damage, sustained
as a direct result of the criminal offense, compensated in criminal proceedings." 1d. at art. 62. However,
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injured party may claim compensation only for those pecuniary and non-
pecuniary losses that result directly from the criminal offense committed by
the accused.209
The rule is that a person who makes an adhesion claim is exempt from
the duty to pay an admittance fee (wpis), which is generally required to
initiate civil proceedings. 210 If the claim is accepted by a criminal court
(wholly or even partially), these costs are awarded at the expense of the
accused (pursuant to Article 643 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings). The
civil claimant would bear them only when the adhesion claim was dis-
missed (pursuant to Article 644 § I of the Code of Criminal Proceedings).
In practice, the injured person hardly ever initiates adhesion pro-
ceedings. Medical malpractice cases are complicated, time-consuming, and
more expensive than criminal litigation, since they usually require expert
opinions (especially when the injuries sustained by a patient result from
errors in the medical art).211 In criminal proceedings, priority is given to the
perpetrator's criminal liability, which ought to be established as quickly as
possible in order to fulfill the repressive and preventative function of penal
law. Thus, there is a high probability that the criminal court leaves the ad-
hesion claim unrecognized, pursuant to Article 415 § 2 and § 3 of the Code
of Civil Proceedings. The decision as such is obligatory when the accused
has not been convicted, the evidence revealed during the trial is found in-
sufficient to adjudicate adhesion claim, and any supplement thereof causes
excessive lengthiness of the proceedings. 212
V. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF DOCTORS
Except for civil and criminal liability, doctors, as members of medical
chambers (izby lekarskie),213 may also bear professional liability for con-
there is no possibility to initiate adhesion proceedings if the same claim for compensation is either
subject to other litigation, e.g. a civil one (lis pendens), or has already been concluded with a final valid
decision (res iudicata).
209. According to doctrine, it is impossible to claim compensation for a mere non-pecuniary loss.
P. Mierzejewski, KOMPENDIUM PRAWA KARNEGO 20 (2010). Compare J. Gajewski, PRZEBIEG PROCESU
KARNEGO, 147 (2008).
210. According to the provisions of the Law on Costs of Civil Court Proceedings of 28 July 2005 a
plaintiff is to make a payment of 5% of the amount of damages he claims, however not less than PLN
30 (7,5 E) and not more than PLN 100,000 (25,600 f). See Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2005, No.
167, item 1398 (Pol.); see also J. Jodlowski et. al., POSTFPOWANIE CYWILNE 300-310 (6th. ed. 2009).
211. The average time to decide a case is two to four years for less complicated cases (where there
is no cassation to the Supreme Court). However, it may even be eight to ten years for more difficult
cases concerning errors in the medical art, in which a medical expert opinion is usually required.
212. See P. Mierzejewski, supra note 205, at 207; J. Gajewski, supra note 209, at 148.
213. Regional medical chambers and the Central Medical Chamber are institutional manifestations
of doctors' professional 'self-government.' They supervise the performance of the medical profession
by carrying the disciplinary proceedings, represent the interests of doctors, adopt the rules of medical
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duct contrary to the principles of ethics and medical deontology2 14 and the
breach of provisions concerning the performance of the medical profession
(przewinienie zawodowe), pursuant to the regulations of Chapter 5 of the
new Law on Medical Chambers of December 2, 2009215.
Disciplinary proceedings are carried by regional medical courts (com-
posed of three judges) and the Supreme Medical Court of Professional
Liability, which adjudicates in the second instance (in a panel of three to
five members, including a judge of the Supreme Court as chairman). 216
Under certain conditions, an appeal (the so-called Extraordinary Appeal)
may be made to the Supreme Court.217 No petition of the injured patient
(pokrzywdzony) is required, since the proceedings are initiated upon a mo-
tion of a disciplinary commissioner (rzecznik odpowiedzialnoici zawodo-
wej), who acts as the prosecutor and is responsible for conducting
preparatory proceedings.218 In the case where the same professional mis-
conduct is subject to a civil or criminal litigation, the medical court is al-
lowed to suspend its proceedings until civil or criminal proceedings are
finished if their result may influence the disciplinary judgment. 219 The
medical court (in the trial) or disciplinary commissioner (during the prepa-
ratory proceedings) may also initiate mediation between the accused doctor
(obwiniony) and the injured patient. A mediator is a doctor appointed for
this function by the medical chamber of the locality where the doctor prac-
tices his profession.
ethics and take care of physicians' professional education and the development of vocational skills.
Medical chambers also grant the doctors the right to practice the medical profession; they are also the
keeper of the register of doctors who have been permitted to perform treatment. M. Nesterowicz, E.
Bagifiska, A. den Exter, Medical Law Monograph, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS
35(2007).
214. Principles of ethics and medical deontology are embodied in the Code of Medical Ethics
(Kodeks Etyki Lekarskiej) of 2 January 2004, adopted by the 7th Extraordinary National Congress of
Physicians. The Code determines standards of performing the medical profession, principles of medical
practice, doctor's duties towards the patient and the population as a whole, mutual relations between
doctors, and the principles of scientific research and medical experiments. See M. Nesterowicz, E.
Bagihska, A. den Exter, Medical Law Monograph, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS 64
2007).
215. Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2009, No. 219, item 1708 (Pol.).
216. M. Nesterowicz, E. Bagifiska, A. den Exter, Medical Law Monograph, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS 64 ( 2007).
217. An extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court may also be lodged against a valid judgment
regarding professional liability by the Minister of Health and the President of the Central Medical
Chamber. M. Nesterowicz, E. Bagifiska, A. den Exter, supra note 216, at 65.
218. These proceedings consist of making all the ascertainments and investigations necessary to
explain the circumstances of the alleged professional misconduct. If the commissioner finds punishing a
doctor for a certain professional misconduct justified, the latter is charged and consequently interro-
gated. M. Filar, S. Krzed, E. Marszalkowska-Krzeg, P. Zaborowski, Odpowiedzialnoid lekarzy i
zakladdw opieki zdrowotnej, 281 ( 2004).
219. M. Nesterowicz, E. Bagifiska, A. den Exter, supra note 216, at 64.
2011] 1259
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Medical courts may exclusively issue the following penalties: a warn-
ing, a reprimand, a fine, a suspension of the right to practice as a doctor for
a period ranging from six months to three years, and a deprivation of the
right to perform the profession. The sentence of the court (a convicting
judgment), together with the doctor's name and medical license number is
added to the public Register of the Disciplinarily Punished Doctors and
Dentists held by the Central Medical Chamber. 220 However, as case law
provides, if a doctor is found guilty, the court may, in certain circums-
tances, decide not to award a punishment. 221
In the case where the doctor has been found innocent or the procedure
has been quashed as a result of an Extraordinary Appeal or as a result of
proceedings being resumed, the doctor is entitled to claim compensation
from the regional medical chamber.
No proceedings on professional liability may be initiated if three years
have elapsed since the commitment of the act.
CONCLUSION
As for attitudes and concerns about the existing compensation system,
the first thing which requires approval is the current tendency to assure
better protection of the non-material interest of patients by, on the one
hand, awarding higher sums for a non-pecuniary loss and, on the other,
providing additional grounds for moral damages under the Law on Pa-
tients' Rights. The other good solution is the complex liability insurance,
which is compulsory for all health providers, whether or not they partici-
pate in the national health insurance scheme.
However, despite some moderation concerning the burden of proof,
the requirement of the doctor's or hospital's fault is still troublesome for
the injured. The situation of patients who suffer injuries where no one is
guilty (so-called medical accidents) is particularly difficult. After the
amendment of the Civil Code of June 2004, they may not claim damages
on the grounds of the principle of rightness (boni mores) and equity any
more (derogated Article 419 of the Civil Code). Besides, malpractice suits
are still long and expensive, while their result is usually uncertain and not
220. The rules of holding a Register of the Punished Doctors were laid out in the Ordinance of
Minister of Health of 13 July 2010 concerning the form and procedures of holding of the Register of the
Disciplinarily Punished Doctors and Dentists and the way of executing the final judgments of medical
courts (Journal of Laws 2010, No. 130, item 884).
221. See the judgment of the Supreme Court of 18 February 1994 (1 PN 1/94), OSNAPiUS 1994/1,
item 16. Compare Filar, et al., supra note 218, at 281.
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easily predicted. There is an increasing number of cases every year, 222 be-
cause patients are more aware of their rights and prone to claim reim-
bursement if these rights are not observed. Therefore, an introduction of a
no-fault liability regime in Poland may be taken into account. The existing
systems of that kind could serve as good examples, especially the Swedish
No-Fault Patient Insurance (NFPI) and the French scheme which combines
elements of fault and no-fault liability. It seems that implementation of a
no-fault compensation system, at least for medical accidents in Poland, is
the best possible solution to improve the mechanisms of damage compen-
sation and to prevent the spread of a potential malpractice crisis. 223
222. According to statistical data, in 1991 there were 260 (reported) claims concerning medical
malpractice and 80 of them were adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff. In 1999, this number increased to
968 (in 509 of them compensation was granted). As for the last ten years, it is estimated that there have
been around 1,500 malpractice suits annually. Adam Makosz, supra note 56.
223. However, there is a bill of November 2010 which proposes a no-fault compensation scheme
for injuries resulting from so-called medical misfortune (niepowodzenie lecznicze). The draft defines
medical misfortune as an activity concerning diagnosis, therapy or application of medical products
which is inconsistent with requirements of current medical knowledge, provided it results in infections,
bodily impairment, health disturbance, or the patient's death. According to the proposed bill, medical
misfortune claims are to be adjudicated by independent district commissions in special, simplified
procedures that will be less formal, less expensive and much quicker than civil law suits. See E.
Kowalewski, M. Walachowska, M. Sliwka, Kompensacja szkdd wyniklych z ,,blqd6w medycznych".
Ocena projektowanych rozwiqzah prawnych, PRAWO I MEDYCYNA 22 (2010).
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